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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
Brain Death, Organ Transplantation and the Ethics of Relationships 
in Japan: 1968-2000 
by 
Takanobu Kinjo 
Master of Arts, Graduate Program in Biomedical and Clinical Ethics 
Loma Linda University, September 2000 
Dr. David R. Larson, Chairperson 
The center of the brain-death and organ transplantation debate in Japan 
has always been whether whole brain-death should be regarded as the death of 
a person. However, the debate has not yet been settled in Japanese society. 
There are four main reasons why it is said that whole brain-death criteria 
are incompatible with Japanese society. First, they cannot establish a person's 
death because the Japanese define it not according to medical facts but according 
to social relationships. Second, it is impossible to determine societal consensus in 
Japan on this issue. Third, traditional Japanese views toward life and death are 
incompatible with whole brain-death criteria. Fourth, whole brain-death criteria 
for the purpose of organ-transplantation is incompatible with the Japanese ethics 
that emphasizes relationships. The more ongoing and more intimate the 
relationships are between family members and the deceased, the more probable 
it is that family members will perceive him or her a living person and the less 
likely it is that they will accept whole brain-death criteria with respect to their 
beloved one. 
The essential cause of these problems is the "wall" between the two sides 
'Ti 
which implies insensitivity and indifference to the needs of those on the other 
side; What is missing in the controversy is a mutual understanding of these 
issues on the part of those on both the donor and the recipient sides. Because 
the Japanese people do not have a special ethics like Christian neighbor-love, one 
form of moral imagination which helps North Americans see strangers as if they 
are loved ones, and because the Japanese do not have the custom of giving gifts 
without reciprocity, it is unrealistic to expect them to donate organs to strangers. 
The most promising solution would be to abolish the ordinary practice of 
maintaining anonymity between those on the donor and the recipient sides so 




The Controversy in Japan: 
Review 
In order to understand the whole brain-death and organ transplantation 
debate in contemporary Japan, it is necessary to review certain historical events. 
Such reviews offer good starting points, generate debates, and provide 
information from which inferences can be drawn and valuable lessons learned. 
In this study, a review of the historical background is very important in at least 
two ways. First, it will foster understanding of the unique, but at the same time, 
peculiar history of whole brain-death and organ transplantation in Japan. This is 
the history of the total prohibition of whole brain-death criteria and 
transplantation for almost 30 years. Second, an historical review will also help 
identify the central issues in the whole brain-death and organ transplantation 
debate in Japan. This is, therefore, an introductory chapter that provides factual 
information needed for the ethical analysis that follows. 
The historical events can be categorized into three periods and reviewed 
in detail. The first period, from 1968 to 1982, was characterized by a total 
prohibition of whole brain-death criteria for organ transplantation in Japan. The 
most notable event in this period was the Wada heart transplantation in 1968. 
This event was so decisive in the Japanese history of organ transplantation that 
it will be closely reviewed in this chapter. The second period, from 1982 to 1992, 
was marked by the active organ transplantation movement along with the anti-
whole brain-death movement. This period must be understood as a transitional 
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one that prompted many disputes regarding whole brain-death as a new 
definition of a person's death for organ transplantation. The third period, from 
1992 to 2000, was a time in which whole brain-death criteria for organ 
transplantation was legislated and several brain-death organ transplantations 
were performed. In this period, Japan plunged into a new era of organ 
transplantation; however, it is not yet clear whether Japanese society has 
accepted it. A summary is provided at the end of this historical review. 
From 1968 to 1982: 
The Wada Heart Transplantation 
On August 8, 1968, Asahi Shinbun, one of the major national newspapers 
in Japan, reported in its evening edition the first heart transplantation in Japan. 
Professor Wada at Sapporo Medical University Hospital transplanted "the heart 
from a young man who was killed by a fatal accident" to another young man 
who had suffered from mitral incompetence, tricuspid insufficiency, and 
aortostenosis. The donor was a 21 year old man who was found drowned 
around noon on August 7, 1968. Forty minutes after the donor was found, 
attempted resuscitation brought back spontaneous respiration while he was 
being transported to the nearest hospital. He was then transported to Sapporo 
Medical University Hospital in order for him to be put into an oxygen tank. On 
the same day around 10 p.m., the donor became brain dead. After about four 
hours he was medically declared dead. The team ceased to use a pump-
oxygenator when the donor's heart condition reached the point of no return 
and began the transplantation for which the donor's family had given the 
consent.1  The recipient lived for 83 days after the transplantation. 
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Between 1968 and 1970, Professor Wada was accused three times by 
other physicians. The charges were: (1) unnecessary but purposeful murder 
(Wada was charged for taking the heart of the donor who was in a state of 
apparent death.) and (2) professional negligence leading to death (Wada 
provided unnecessary transplantation to the recipient leading to the premature 
death of the recipient due to immunological rejection.).2 However, the 
Prosecutor's Office of Sapporo decided to drop the case. 
The Sapporo Prosecutor's Office happened to release the draft of a 
criminal liability report which indicated that the case was filled with doubts and 
unresolved questions. The Prosecutor's Office pointed out that it was doubtful 
that the donor was really dead at the time of the organ procurement. When the 
donor was transported to Sapporo Medical University Hospital, he was treated 
with a pump-oxygenator despite the presence of spontaneous respiration. 
Assuming that spontaneous respiration ceased at a certain time while the donor 
was on the respirator, the prosecutor suggested that death should be declared 
when the respirator was terminated and no spontaneous respiration was 
observed. However, the transplantation team provided no evidence that they 
actually carried out the test and observed a lack of spontaneous respiration 
before declaring the donor's death. Instead, they terminated the respirator at 
2:27 AM and observed that the donor's heart was in a state of fibrillation at 2:30 
AM. Concluding that the donor's heart was in nonreversible cardiac arrest, they 
proceeded to procure the heart. According to the prosecutor's statement of 
criminal reliability, the donor's inability to maintain spontaneous respiration 
was never used to declare his death, thus leaving no evidence of when the 
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donor died. There was a record indicating that the donor's heart showed a 
decline of spontaneity around 10:35 PM. Therefore, the heart's spontaneity 
ceased between 10:35 PM and 2:30 AM when the heart was procured; however, 
the prosecutor could not know exactly when. The prosecutor could not deny 
the possibility that the donor's heart was procured while his heart still had 
spontaneity; but at the same time, the prosecutor could not confirm this.3  
In addition, many pointed out that the transplantation was unnecessary 
for the recipient.4 Miyahara, the recipient's previous attending physician, was 
one of these. Miyahara stated that the recipient suffered from mitral stenosis, 
which he considered not serious enough to require organ transplantation. He 
requested the transfer of the recipient to the surgery department in order for 
him to receive a replacement of an artificial heart valve.5 Another doubtful 
point was that the valves of the recipient's heart were taken apart and hidden 
for about half a year with the donor's heart. The prosecutor then asked the 
department of forensic medicine at Tokyo University to evaluate the valves, but 
the prosecutor was informed that there was no evidence to affirm or deny that 
the valves were replaced by other's. However, many assumed that the valves 
were replaced because the team was afraid a judicial autopsy would find out 
that the team's justification to provide organ transplantation to the recipient, 
organic disfunction in the recipient's heart valves, was not accurate.° At the 
interview, the prosecutor clearly admitted that they decided to drop the case 
simply because there was not enough evidence to prosecute Wada in spite of 
the fact that there were many doubtful questions were left.7  
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It is probably true that the Wada heart transplantation should be 
regarded as the most notorious and the most influential event in the history of 
organ transplantation in Japan. This transplantation should be remembered not 
because it was the thirtieth heart transplantation in the world and the first whole 
brain-death organ transplantation in Japan, but because the case revealed ethical 
problems in Japanese healthcare. It also had negative consequences for the later 
organ transplantation movement in Japan. 
Three negative consequences of the Wada heart transplantation can be 
suggested. First, this event helped the Japanese people to develop a negative 
image of organ transplantation and healthcare in genera1.8 
The second consequence of the Wada transplantation was much more 
clear and serious in terms of its influence on the development of the organ 
transplantation movement in Japan. It eventually created a situation in which 
the prosecutor decided to adhere to traditional signs of death, thus setting a 
restrictive legal standard for determining death in Japan. This meant that the 
prosecutor's office declared that it would prosecute a physician who procured 
organs from a person declared dead according to whole brain criteria. This is 
one of the main reasons why Japanese physicians have been reluctant to 
perform whole brain-death organ transplantation. In Japan, performing whole 
brain-death organ transplantation literally meant that one would be prosecuted. 
This was also part of the reason why many believed whole brain-death organ 
transplantation had to be legalized in Japan. Without legal warrant, it had been 
too risky.9 
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The third consequence of the Wada transplantation has had the most 
pernicious influence on the organ transplantation movement. The two 
consequences already mentioned may convince many that the Wada 
transplantation was mainly responsible for the prohibition of whole brain-death 
organ transplantation in Japan for nearly 30 years. However, the issue of organ 
transplantation is only part of the whole picture. It is accurate to state that 
different issues accumulated and intermingled to hinder whole brain-death 
transplantation in Japan. However, the Wada transplantation should be 
remembered in different way. This transplantation was historically significant 
because the case was not critically reviewed and no fruitful lessons were learned 
from it, which points to the third consequence. The third and most pernicious 
consequence of the transplantation, therefore, was that the case did not 
generate serious discussion of whole brain-death and organ transplantation 
despite its great publicity. 
Lack of serious discussion about whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation is surely the chief characteristic of the period from 1968 to 1982. 
The prosecutor made it clear in the Wada transplantation case that he would 
adhere to the traditional definition of death of a person until physicians offered 
a new definition that achieved societal consensus. However, none of the 
Japanese medical associations, including the Japan Physician Association, the 
Japan Brain-Wave Association, or the Japan Organ Transplantation Association, 
seriously advocated whole brain death. They even appeared to assume too 
optimistically that societal consensus would be reached with ease. 
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In conclusion, the period from 1968 to 1982 was an unproductive period 
in the history of the whole brain-death and organ transplantation controversy 
in Japan. Productive discussions did not occur and valuable lessons were not 
learned from the first controversial whole brain-death transplantation. It 
eventually ended up undermining the significant need to advocate whole brain-
death criteria and to ask Japanese society to re-examine the meaning of a 
person's death. 
From 1982 to 1992: 
Unproductive Controversy 
This period included the beginning of full-scale discussions about whole 
brain-death and organ transplantation and the rise of an active organ 
transplantation movement in Japan. Because the movement's ultimate goal was 
to make organ transplantation possible in Japan, the discussion explored the 
possibility of societal consensus on whole brain-death. The question was 
whether whole brain-death should be regarded by society as the death of a 
person so that organs can be procured from a brain-dead individual for 
transplantation. 
There are four important incidents in this period that deserve 
examination. First, the introduction of the first official Japanese whole brain-
death criteria in 1985, the Takeuchi Criteria, can be regarded as the most 
fundamental step. Second, the Tukuba-dai pancreas-liver simultaneous 
transplantation in 1984 was historically important because of its negative effects 
on the transplantation movement. Third, the Japan Physician Association finally 
established a Bioethics Council to arrive at a consensus on whole brain-death as 
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the death of a person in medical circles. Fourth, Noshi-Rincho (Brain-Death Ad 
Hoc Committee), considered to be the most important event of this period, was 
established by the Japanese Health Administration to build a national consensus 
on whole brain-death as the societal death of a person. 
The Takeuchi Brain-Death Criteria 
In 1983, Koseisyou (the Department of Health and Human Services of the 
Japanese government) took the first step initiating an organ transplantation 
movement by establishing a special study team to develop the first official 
whole brain-death criteria in Japan. The study group was asked to carry out 
nation-wide research on clinical brain-death cases, analyze them, and develop 
competent brain-death criteria that would subsequently make whole brain-
death organ transplantation possible in Japan. The developed criteria, now 
commonly called 'Takeuchi Criteria' after the chief director of the team, adapted 
the Harvard whole brain-death criteria. These criteria defined brain death as the 
irreversible loss of the whole brain's function. The criteria required six 
conditions to be met in order to declare brain death: (1) "deep coma, 300- Japan 
coma scale, 3- Glasgow coma scale," (2) "apnea, confirmed by apnea test," (3) 
"bilaterally fixed pupils larger than 4 mm in diameter," (4) "absent corneal, 
ciliospinal, oculocephalic, vestibular, pharyngeal and cough reflexes," (5) 
"isoelectric electroencephalogram," and (6) "duration of observation: 6 hours, 
or longer if necessary."1° In addition, these criteria required at least two or 
more physicians with adequate experience with brain-death cases to declare 
death based on these standards. The validity of the Takeuchi Criteria is 
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apparently well established because many agree that the criteria are as strict as 
any other whole brain-death criteria in the world." Also, the special team 
specifically declared that the criteria were established only to define clinical 
criteria for brain death, but not to create new definition of a person's death.12 
The Tukuba-Dai Pancreas-Liver Simultaneous Transplantation 
The Tukuba-Dai transplantation is historically important because of its 
negative influence upon the organ transplantation movement in Japan. When 
this incident took place, the special study team was in the process of formulating 
the Takeuchi Criteria. Therefore, there was no medical or societal consensus in 
Japan regarding whole brain-death. In addition, the physician who carried out 
the transplantation was a member of the special study team. Therefore, the 
physician should have known and understood that whole brain-death was not 
accepted in Japanese society and that he would be prosecuted if he procured 
organs from a brain-dead patient.13 
The important difference from the Wada heart transplantation case was 
that there was clear evidence in the Tukuba-Dai case that the physicians 
procured the organs while the donor's heart was still beating. Thus the case was 
guaranteed to be prosecuted. Another controversial point of the case was that 
the donor had a high degree of mental disability. The consent for the donation 
was given by the donor's husband who remembered the donor saying that she 
wanted to donate her organs while they watched the news of Wada heart 
transplantation 14 years earlier.14 The physicians were accused in 1985 and the 
Prosecutor's Office is still investigating the case.15 The consequence of this case 
was to slow down the organ transplantation movement. Some believe that the 
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special study team took over two years to develop the Takeuchi Brain-Death 
Criteria because of the controversy caused by the Tukuba-Dai case. 
The Bioethics Committee of the Japan Physician Association 
After the formulation of brain-death criteria in 1985, the Japan Physician 
Association established a Bioethics Committee in 1988 that aimed at fostering 
consensus on whole brain-death in Japanese medical circles. The committee 
made two important points in its position paper. First, the committee argued 
that the most important aspects of a human being are: the capacity of the brain 
stem to coordinate biological life, and the mental activity that resides in the 
cerebral portions of the brain. Having said that, the committee concluded that 
whole brain-death could be considered the death of a person from medical and 
biological perspectives because in it a patient has lost what it regarded as the 
most important aspects of being human. Second, the committee suggested that 
whole brain-death should be legally defined as the death of a person for two 
reasons: (a) legalizing it would eliminate the possibility of being prosecuted if 
one procured organs from a brain-dead person, and (b) legalizing brain-death 
was the most effective way to achieve societal consensus.16 
The Brain-Death Ad Hoc Committee  
In 1990, the Department of Health and Human Services of the Japanese 
government established what was called, "Noshi-Rincho" (The Brain-Death Ad 
Hoc Committee) which sought a settlement of the whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation controversy.17 The committee consisted of persons in various 
professions including physicians, social workers, lawyers, writers, and 
philosophers. Aiming at reaching an agreement on whether brain death is the 
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death of a person, and under what conditions brain-death organ transplantation 
should be allowed, the committee held thirty-three regular meetings, three 
overseas field trips, two opinion polls, and six public hearings. The work of this 
committee was therefore the most important development in this period 
because the progress of the organ transplantation movement depended on how 
well this committee developed societal consensus. However, the committee 
failed to reach "Manjo-Icchi" (unanimous agreement) which was expected to be 
mandatory in Japan for such governmental commissions, and ended up 
delivering two separate position papers: a majority opinion and a minority 
opinion. 
Review of the Majority Opinions. The majority opinion begins by 
examining the death of a person from medical and biological perspectives. 
Because of the introduction of respirators during the 1960s, medicine and 
biology had begun witnessing whole brain-death and had begun to understand 
a person as a living system or an organic and integrated individual that 
possesses both consciousness and sensation. The majority opinion, thus, defines 
the life of person as a state of organic integration as a whole; it is a state in which 
internal organs maintain mutual dependency, a state in which organs 
purposefully and sensibly maintain different mental and physical activities and 
preserve homeostasis. Subsequently the majority opinion defines the death of a 
person as a state in which a person loses such organic integration as a whole. 
Having said that, the majority opinion insists that the whole brain, 
including the brain stem, possesses functions that maintain this organic 
integration as a whole. It agrees with the recent trend in medicine and biology 
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to regard the loss of whole brain function as the death of a person because 
whole brain-death does mean to lose organic integration as a whole. The 
majority opinion uses the reports of medical advisors to demonstrate that 
certain human cells show signs of life for a long period of time after the heart 
has arrested. It concludes that postponing the declaration of death until all 
brain cells have died is unreasonable. Therefore, the majority opinion insists 
that the determination of the irreversible loss of the functioning of the entire 
brain is medically sufficient to determine whether a patient has lost organic 
integration as a whole and is dead. The majority opinion also affirms that the 
Takeuchi Brain Death Criteria, developed eight years earlier, is still valid and 
effective. 
Next, the majority opinion examines the most controversial point, that is, 
whether Japanese society should accept whole brain-death as the societal death 
of a person. However, as the minority opinion points out, the majority opinion 
concludes this without providing sufficient and justifiable evidence. The 
majority opinion's basic opinions are three folded. First, the majority opinion 
discusses mind-body dualism. Second, the majority opinion talks about 
traditional Japanese ethics and religions. And finally, the majority opinion 
concludes that it is appropriate to carry out whole brain-death organ 
transplantation in Japan. 
The minority opinion insists that mind-body dualism, which helped 
Westerners implement organ donation, does not fit with the traditional 
Japanese view of life and death. In response, the majority opinion defends its 
position by merely saying that "it is difficult to imagine that there is direct 
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relationship between mind-body dualism and the definition of death of a person 
as the condition where a person loses organic integration as a whole"18 without 
providing any explanation nor supporting evidence. 
In addition, in response to the minority opinion's insistence that 
traditional Japanese ethics and religious perspectives do not accord with a 
definition of brain-death as the societal death of a person, the majority opinion 
only states that "from Japanese traditional religious and ethical perspectives, we 
are not able to find any practical reason why we must reject the new definition 
of death."19 However, the majority opinion fails to provide even one single 
supporting explanation or line of evidence to justify its statement. 
The majority opinion finally appears to provide a justification of organ 
transplantation from whole brain-dead patients by saying that "the new 
definition of death is widely accepted by many foreign nations which have 
different cultural and religious backgrounds, and accords with the 
understanding of a person's death in the international community. "2° The 
majority opinion therefore concludes that whole brain-death is the societal 
death of person. However, it is easy to agree with the minority opinion's 
criticism that the Majority opinion's argument is invalid and unjustifiable 
because its conclusion lack supporting evidence and explanations. It is very 
difficult to understand why the majority opinion spends only a few paragraphs 
on the most vital part of the whole brain-death and organ transplantation 
controversy. 
Review of the Minority Opinion. The minority opinion consists of two 
major parts. In the first part, the minority opinion criticizes the majority 
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opinion. In the second part, the minority opinion presents its basic position 
statements to support its thesis that whole brain-death can not be regarded as 
the societal death of a person in Japan. 
First, the minority opinion summarizes the majority opinion's viewpoints 
on whole brain-death as follows: 
Death should be considered as a medical and biological event, but 
also as a societal and lawful (judicial) event as well as a 
philosophical and religious event. However, when defining the 
death of a person, medical and biological understandings of death 
must take precedence over others. We cannot prevent ourselves 
from agreeing that whole brain death should be regarded as the 
death of a person because, according to the most recent 
understanding of death from medical and biological perspectives, 
the death of a person must be understood as the loss of brain 
functions that preserve the integration of biological and organic 
activities.21 
The minority opinion then criticizes the majority opinion's greater reliance on 
medical and biological understandings of death as compared to philosophical, 
religious, and cultural understandings of death. In addition, it also criticizes the 
majority opinion's understanding of a human being as an integrated biological 
and organic unit. Furthermore, the minority opinion insists that the new 
definition does not make any sense to the Japanese people because of their 
natural perception that a brain-dead individual is still a living person. Then the 
minority opinion suggests that there must be some more basic reason that 
drives the majority opinion to advocate such inconsistent and inaccurate 
definitions of death. 
The controversial gap between the majority and the minority opinions is 
confirmed by the interpretation of opinion polls about brain death. The two polls 
conducted by the committee demonstrated that almost half of the Japanese 
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people regard whole brain-death as death of a person. The majority opinion 
interprets this result as a clear sign that Japanese society is ready to accept whole 
brain-death as death of a person. On the contrary, the minority opinion 
interprets the same result as a sign that Japanese society still resists the idea of 
whole brain-death. It therefore criticizes the majority opinion for 
inappropriately using the poll results and drawing too optimistic and unrealistic 
conclusions. 
Charging that the majority opinion's ideological positions are governed 
by scientism, rationalism, human-mechanism, and Westernism, the minority 
opinion identifies its fundamental ideological positions as follows: 
We choose not to depend upon these ideological positions that the 
majority opinion takes, but we emphasize that a person's body is a 
host of the spirit as well as biological life. We respect the human 
being not only for rational thinking, understanding that a human 
being's life shares its significance with the lives of other species on 
this earth. We resist scientism's excessive strides, honor the 
cultural tradition of mankind, and critically adopt modern Western 
civilization and culture.22 
Although the minority opinion realizes how difficult it is to determine which 
opinion is more truthful, it holds that its position should receive at least as much 
attention and respect as the majority opinion. 
Understanding that whole brain-death is very close to the death of a 
person, the minority opinion admits that it is very hard to find reasons to 
denounce a donor's sincere and voluntary will to donate organs to others. In 
addition, it also recognizes that a voluntary choice to donate organs does not 
offend the spirit of Christian love or the Buddhist understanding of life and 
death. Therefore, it is willing to open a path that would make organ 
procurement possible as a legally justifiable medical action. 
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The minority opinion proposes four conditions to carry out whole brain-
death organ transplantation in Japan without defining and legalizing that whole 
brain-death is the societal death of a person: (1) an official written document that 
clearly shows the donor's will to donate organs, (2) maintenance of equal 
opportunity in recipient selection, (3) valid informed consent to receive 
transplantation, and (4) development of certain systems that ensure the patient's 
rights and autonomy. 
Several observations are in order. First, the committee could not reach 
agreement on the matter that was its ultimate goal: whether whole-brain death 
ought to be regarded as the societal death of a person in Japan. Part of the 
reason for this disagreement is that the majority opinion did not support its 
position at all and did not respond to the minority opinion's questions. Of 
course, there were essentially different opinions on the matter among the 
committee members which were in large part responsible for the disagreement; 
however, it is never possible to resolve disagreements without intense discussion 
and the dynamic exchange of critical opinions. At the end of its position paper, 
the committee concludes: "While paying close attention to the fact that there are 
various opinions in regards to the death of a person, the committee hopes ,to see 
that brain-death organ transplantation guided by good sense is carried forward 
to benefit as many patients as possible."23 This final statement, which well 
represents the committee's conclusion, is at most vague and indecisive. This 
leads to the conclusion that the Ad Hoc Committee failed to settle the whole 
brain-death and organ transplantation controversy in Japan. In short, this 
period, from 1982 to 1992, can be considered as the beginning of the organ 
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transplantation era in vain. Discussions were provoked and opinions were 
presented, but no productive exchanges took place that achieved consensus. 
From 1992-2000: 
Legislation and Implementation 
This period was marked by the introduction of organ transplantation 
legislation and the first organ transplantation from a whole brain-dead patient 
since 1964. After the Brain Death Ad Hoc Committee submitted its final report 
to the "Koseisyou" (Department of Health and Human Services), the members of 
the National Diet voluntarily formed a bioethics study group to prepare for 
proposing an organ transplantation bill in 1993. In December of the same year, 
several political parties established a special discussion council about whole brain-
death and organ transplantation. In the following year it proposed the first draft 
of an organ transplantation law that defined whole brain-death as the death of a 
person. "Nichibenren" (The Japan Federation of Bar Associations) immediately 
released a statement objecting to the council's proposal. On January of 1994, the 
Department of Health and Human Services proposed guidelines for procuring 
organs which allowed family members to donate organs without a donor's 
consent. In April of the same year, the bill was finally submitted to the Lower 
House, but political turmoil over other issues prevented its discussion. Two 
years later, on June of 1996, the bill was modified to limit organ procurement to 
cases in which the donor's choice to donate organs was assured in a written 
consent forms. The bill was then returned to the Lower House, but three month 
later the bill was once more abandoned due to the dissolution of the Lower 
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House. On December of the same year, the new bill, called the Nakayama 
proposal, was re-submitted to the Lower House, but deliberation of the bill was 
again delayed. On March of 1997, the Japan Organ Transplantation Association 
finally developed its own guidelines to allow brain death transplantation in Japan 
without relying upon the law. At the same time, the Kanada proposal, which 
does not define whole brain-death as a person's death, was submitted to the 
Lower House. Again the main argument in the House was whether whole 
brain-death ought to be defined as the death of a person.24 
The Organ Transplantation Law  
In April of 1997, the Nakayama proposal was carried and the Kaneda 
proposal was withdrawn by the Lower House. The bill was then submitted to 
the Upper House, but by the next month another proposal similar to the Kaneda 
proposal was also submitted. In order to resolve this conflict, "whether the law 
should define whole brain-death as person's death," the Upper House finally 
settled for a modified Nakayama proposal which was considered to be an 
appropriate compromise. According to this compromise, whole brain-death was 
defined to be death of a person only when organ donation had been voluntarily 
offered and organ procurement was to follow. The modified bill was re-
submitted and carried by the Upper House as well as the Lower House on April 
17, 1997. 
This organ transplantation law, the modified Nakayama proposal, has 
three noteworthy points. First, whole brain-death is considered to be the death 
of a person only in cases of organ transplantation under two conditions: (1) 
presentation of the donor's written consent to donate his or her organs and (2) 
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the presence of no objections from the donor's relatives. Therefore, this 
definition of death should be regarded as a new definition of death specifically 
for organ transplantation. Second, the law acknowledges the right of the 
donor's family to override the donor's choice to donate his or her organs. In 
another words, the family members of the donor, not the donor himself or 
herself, retains ultimate control. Third, the law prohibits organ procurement 
from those under 14 years of age. Organ donation is only allowed by the law 
when the donor has autonomously and voluntary chosen to donate his or her 
organs. Because in Japan fifteen is earliest age one is allowed to write a living 
will, the law holds that those under fourteen can not make an autonomous and 
voluntary decision to donate organs.25  
Brain Death Organ Transplantation in Japanese Law  
On October of 1997, half a year after the law was passed, the 
transplantation law was finally implemented. Many people expected whole 
brain-death organ transplantation to take place shortly. However, one year and 
four months passed before the first organ transplantation from a brain dead 
person actually took place.26 It is possible that the very strict requirements of 
the law caused- the delay. A donor must obtain a donor card, follows its 
directions precisely, and provide his or her own and other family member's 
signatures. Without a donor card, none of the any other written or oral forms of 
consent is valid. Physical presentation of this donor card is required to procure 
organs from the donor and proceed with organ transplantation. 
There have been at least eight whole brain-death transplantations 
performed in Japan since the law was implemented. Some of these eight 
19 
transplantations included minor mistakes and pose certain questions. The most 
controversial question is how to balance the obligation to disclose information to 
the public and also to protect the privacy of the donors' and recipients' families. 
The Department of Health and Human Services makes clear that only 
information that is permitted by the donor's and recipient's relatives will be 
disclosed. It even suggests that none of the information will be disclosed if 
family member desire this.27 This, too, has generated much controversy. 
A Summary 
In this chapter, the history of the whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation controversy in Japan has been reviewed in three periods. The 
first period, from 1968 to 1982, was the most primitive and most futile part of the 
history. This era witnessed the controversial Wada heart transplantation in 
Japan, but it failed to review the case critically. This resulted in the total 
prohibition of whole brain-death organ transplantation in Japan for over thirty 
years. The second period, from 1982 to 1992, finally gave rise to various organ-
transplantation movements, but failed to lead society in achieving consensus 
about whole-brain-death due to the fact that none of the committees or study 
teams provided fundamental solutions to the conflict stemming from different 
views on whole brain-death. Without deciding whether whole brain-death 
should be regarded as the death of a person, the next period, from 1992 to 2000, 
witnessed relevant legislation and at least five brain-death organ transplantations 
between 1998 to 2000. The organ transplantation law in Japan is unique in the 
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world because it regards whole brain death as the death of a person only when 
the donor has chosen to donate organs and organ procurement follows. 
From this historical review of the whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation controversy in Japan, we are able to arrive at one important 
conclusion: the whole brain-death debate has not yet been settled in Japanese 
society. The review tells us that the center of the debate has always been 
whether whole brain-death should be regarded as the death of a person. Organ 
transplantation has attracted much attention by the public in Japan not because 
transplanting someone's organs is controversial but because the majority of 
donors are brain dead. The various committees could not reach an agreement 
on the single most important point, whether whole brain-death ought to be 
accepted by society as the death of a person. Furthermore, organ 
transplantation legislation was vigorously debated at one point: whether whole 
brain-death should be defined as the death of a person by the law. As a result, 
the law does not recognize whole brain-death as person's death in general, only 
with regard to organ transplantation. If the whole brain-death debate has not 
yet resolved, what is the reason? What prevents Japanese from accepting whole 
brain-death? Does this also prevent Japanese from donating their relative's 
organs? The next chapter will explore various anti whole brain-death arguments 
and try to answer these questions. 
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Chapter H 
The Controversy in Japan: 
Analysis 
The historical review in the last chapter revealed that the leading 
problematic and yet-to-be-resolved issue in the whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation controversy in contemporary Japan is whether whole brain-
death is the death of a person. The purpose of this chapter is to explore this 
crucial issue further from various Japanese perspectives. These include the 
Japanese views of life and death, traditional religions, and ethics. It is evident 
that this study cannot cover all of the vast and diverse arguments of the 
controversy. It therefore reviews the most prominent arguments carefully and 
summarizes them in the following four points: (1) brain-death criteria are 
nothing but neurological criteria, but the death of a person is an important social 
event which should be determined by the whole of Japanese society, not 
medicine alone; (2) a consensus to define brain-death as a person's death has not 
been reached by Japanese society; (3) the concept of brain-death does not fit with 
traditional Japanese views of death; and (4) the Japanese have a distinctive ethical 
orientation that emphasizes relationships in a way that makes it difficult for them 
to adopt the concept of brain death, particularly when it is advocated in order to 
make organ procurement and transplantation possible. 
Medicine and Society 
The first common objection against whole-brain death in Japan is that it 
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provides merely medical and biological criteria that cannot be equated with the 
definition of a person's death. In 1992, the minority opinion of the Japanese 
Brain Death Ad Hoc Committee summarized the majority opinion as follows: 
"medical and biological perspectives should have priority over other social, legal, 
philosophical perspectives for the sake of defining a person's death."28 The 
minority opinion of the committee criticized this suggestion. It insisted that 
medicine does not have the authority to define the death of a person because the 
Japanese people view death as a societal event 
Some believe that medical criteria for death can become the definition of 
societal death only through certain procedures. When the first Japanese whole 
brain-death criteria were introduced in 1983, Takeuchi, who was the chairman of 
the brain-death committee, noted that the report simply proposed criteria or 
standards of whole brain-death, but it never intended to introduce new a 
definition.2 9 
Uozumi suggests that only Japanese society as a whole should decide 
whether to accept whole brain-death criteria as a new definition of a person's 
death. "A criterion of medical death could become the criterion of societal death 
through an appropriate process" he says. "Once the medical criteria receive 
societal recognition as a person's death, physicians will finally be granted the 
right to use them to declare a person's death."3° Hara believes that the lawyer's 
role is to actualize society's consensus about whole brain-death issues and to help 
establish a balance of benefits for donors, recipients, and families only after 
consensus is reached by the whole Japanese community. This belief leads him to 
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deny that medicine has the authority to define whole brain-death as the person's 
death.31  
Given the viewpoints presented, it is clear that the Japanese differentiate 
societal death from medical or biological death. Many insist that the definition of 
societal death can be equated with the whole brain-death criteria only when the 
Japanese society approves it in a formal process called "social consensus." 
The Absence of Consensus 
The second general argument against whole brain-death in Japan is that 
Japanese society has not yet arrived at this consensus in favor of it. There appear 
to be several reasons for this. One of them is that there is no effective and useful 
tool with which to measure the degree of consensus on this issue. Polls and 
surveys are not effective tools because in Japan they are frequently used with 
varying results. The Brain Death Ad Hoc Committee, nationwide newspapers, 
and "Sonfu" (Office of the Prime Minister) have all repeatedly carried out polls to 
see whether Japanese society is ready to accept whole brain-death without 
success. It is helpful to look at some of results to see how these polls and surveys 
are not reliable. 
The Office of the Prime Minister conducted a poll on the people's attitude 
toward whole brain-death and organ transplantation in 1985. Forty-six percent 
of the people thought that whole brain-death organ transplantation should not 
be done while only thirty percent thought it should and twenty-four percent 
were uncertain.32 Surprisingly, totally opposite results were found in a poll 
administered by Asahi Shinbun, one of the Japan's major national newspapers, in 
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the same year. This poll revealed that fifty-two percent of the people answered 
'yes' to the question "organ transplantation from [whole] brain-death cannot be 
prevented from taking place" while twenty-nine percent believed that it should 
not occur.33 Margaret Lock, a philosopher who has published several articles 
regarding the whole brain-death and organ-transplantation issues in Japan, 
remarks that the survey results she has encountered are all paradoxical to her: 
"All the surveys reveals a paradox, however, in that many people 
approve of organ transplants from brain-dead patients, although 
they themselves do not accept brain death as the end of life. It 
seems that Japanese people are willing to allow transplants to take 
place, even though they personally would not be comfortable with 
participating in such a procedure"34 
As Lock indicates, the various poll and survey results appear to reveal 
inconsistent attitudes among Japanese people toward the issues. These 
inconsistent results make one feel that the Japanese continuously oscillate or that 
maybe there is no social consensus. At this point, there appear to be three ways 
to interpret this situation. First, it can be assumed that there is a "real" and 
consistent Japanese attitude toward whole brain-death somewhere and that we 
must continue to search for it. Second, it can be assumed that the Japanese 
people really do change their attitudes; perhaps their attitudes are so ambivalent 
and so inconsistent that it is extremely difficult to summarize them one way or 
other. Third, it can be assumed that there is some other factor that makes it 
appear that Japanese attitudes towatd whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation are inconsistent and uncertain, as if their attitude oscillate from 
one position to the other. 
The third alternative is the most consistent with the findings of this study. 
There is a distinctive Japanese ethics that prompts the Japanese people to act in 
25 
particular ways in particular situations so that their attitudes appear inconsistent 
and paradoxical to others. It is necessary carefully to study the poll and survey 
results in order to discover what is really going on 
Despite all these drawbacks, the results of the polls taken from 1998 to 
1999 appear to be more reliable because they provide similar results. Asahi-
Shinbun conducted two polls in 1998 and 1999, before and after the first whole 
brain-death organ transplantation since 1968. The results were very similar: the 
number of people who accepted whole brain-death was fifty-three percent in 
1998 and fifty-one percent in 1999.35 This suggests that finally the Japanese 
started to form consistent attitudes toward whole brain-death; however it also 
suggests that the first organ-transplantation under 
change. 
Another recent poll shows that accepting 
 
the new law led to no attitude 
whole brain-death is a totally 
different issue for the Japanese from donating organs for transplantation. This 
national poll was conducted by the Office of the Prime Minister in 1998. It 
showed that thirty-two percent of the Japanese people are willing to donate 
organs if they become brain dead, but thirty-eight percent are not willing to do 
SO.36  
The three polls interestingly share one identical result: about sixty percent 
of the Japanese people would like to honor and fulfill a family member's choice 
to donate his or her organs. This reveals an interesting contrast; the number of 
people who want to donate organs (thirty-two percent) is actually lower than 
the number of people who believe that whole brain-death is the death of a 
person (about fifty-two percent). The number o people who would agree to 
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donate a family members' organ (sixty-one percent) is also higher than the 
number who believe in brain death (about fifty-two percent). 
From this interesting contrast, it is tempting to speculate that whether the 
Japanese decide to donate organs does not depe7d ultimately on whether they 
accept the concept of whole brain-death. Once the Japanese are asked to honor 
and fulfill a family member's choice instead of their own decision to donate 
  
organs, the number suddenly jumps up to about sixty percent. This is ten percent 
higher than the number of people who believe in the concept of whole brain-
death, about twenty percent higher than the number who want to donate their 
own organs, and about thirty percent higher than those who do not want to 
donate organs. 
As stated previously, the prevalent assumption is that whole brain-death 
criteria prevent Japanese people from donating organs. However, these results 
reveal that honoring a family member's choice 
receives the most approval, even higher than the 
that whole brain-death is a person's death. This 
to donate his or her organs 
percent of those who believe 
suggests that there might be 
another more powerful factor than whole brain-death criteria that influences 
Japanese's attitudes toward organ donation and transplantation. 
Despite the fact that recent polls finally come up with similar and thus 
more reliable results, it is still difficult to say that they finally depict a Japanese 
consensus. In fact, it appears that survey results cannot be used to indicate 
consensus because the same numbers can be interpreted differently by various 
individuals and groups. In the 1990s, when the various polls indicated that 
between sixty five to forty five percent of the Japanese people believed in whole 
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brain-death criteria and about thirty to forty percent were willing to donate 
organs, the majority opinion of the Brain-Death Ad Hoc Committee used these 
survey results to conclude that consensus had been reached. On the other hand, 
the minority opinion referred to other survey results which showed that forty-
seven percent of people believed in whole brain-death criteria, and pointed out 
that this number "did not even reached fifty percent."37 It concluded that 
consensus had not been reached on this matte r. From this example, it is 
apparent that the problem stems from how the numbers are interpreted. For 
instance, if one survey showed that eighty percent of the Japanese are willing to 
donate organs, it is still possible to say that the percent is not high enough to 
conclude that consensus has been reached or vice versa. Because there is no 
shared understanding of what social consensus is all about, each can freely 
  
define what it is and interpret the statistics accordingly. The danger is that 
persons and groups are tempted to use self-defined and interpreted 
understandings of consensus to justify their own positions. 
Social consensus is actually an ambiguous concept. Hara effectively 
describes what it means in Japanese society: 
I always ask one question to those who insist that brain death is a 
person's death and social consensus has been reached on this 
matter. The question is 'Are you going to bring a gift or Koten 
(monetary offering to a departed spirit) when your close friend 
becomes brain dead?' Almost no person could answer the 
question. One person said, "If I bring koten, they will knock me 
down." No matter what medicine or the law says, we should not 
bring koten to the family if we do not want to hurt their feelings. 
When we no longer feel hesitant to bring koten, and the family does 
not feel awkward receiving it, we will be able to say that consensus 
has been reached in our society.38 
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Hara's approach suggests that consensus is not something that can be defined, 
discussed, and decided. Rather consensus ought to be regarded as a gradual 
process which takes much time to develop. 
There is an additional reason why it is difficult to attain consensus on 
whole brain-death in Japanese society. When facing important medical decisions, 
the Japanese people tend to change their minds easily depending on surrounding 
situations. To be more specific, it depends on who will receive care in the family. 
  
Fetters, having conducted many collaborative research projects with Japanese 
health professionals, provides a good example of the phenomena called the 
"cancer disclosure paradox": "If affected by cancer themselves, they would 
prefer to be told the truth, but that if a family member were afflicted with cancer, 
they would not want the family member to be told."39 Fetters writes that what 
causes such paradoxical change in attitudes is unknown. In the same paradoxical 
way, it is very possible that the Japanese may agree to donate their organs but 
decline to donate those of relatives, or vice versa. 
In general, the Japanese people have a tendency not to make important 
decisions by themselves. Becker points out that the Japanese people find 
normative guidelines for their decision-making in interpersonal relationships. 
They carefully consider how one's action will influence others, and then they 
cautiously choose an action that aims at least not to harm others, but to enhance 
interpersonal relationships. Becker also suggests that Japanese society regards 
  
individual decision-making as something negative. He concludes that it is very 
difficult to see Japanese society arriving at consensus on this controversial whole 
brain-death and organ transplantation issue.40 Nakajima insists that there is no 
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way such consensus can be reached in Japan because the debate is too 
comprehensive and academic and because whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation are too unfamiliar and unrealistic for most Japanese.41 Many 
tend not to take the debate seriously until they are actually put into a situation 
where a beloved one becomes brain dead. 
In light of the unlikelihood of attaining consensus on whole brain-death 
and organ transplantation in Japan, Uozumi makes a notable suggestion. It is 
that Japanese society ought to recognize and accept free and independent family- 
based choices on the definition of a person's death. He regards this as a first step 
  
toward achieving eventually social consensus. Because it is difficult to attain 
consensus at this moment, allowing a family, the smallest unit of society, to 
choose either whole brain-death or cardiovascular death would at least 
safeguard against the abuse of human rights.42 This view was reflected in the 
Brain-Death Organ Transplantation Law legislated in 1997 which virtually 
guarantees the right of family members to choose whole brain-death or 
traditional cardiovascular death. 
It is not certain, however, that this transplantation law will help to 
establish consensus. In addition, it is easy to agree with Lock's view that "one is 
left with the feeling, voiced by many members of the Japanese public, that the 
  
whole exercise of repeatedly surveying the nation is essentially a farce, and that 
the idea of trying to achieve a simple consensus on such an inflammatory subject 
is without meaning."43 The reason for this is evident: the concept of consensus is 
too vague to be used for settling a public policy controversy. Consensus should 
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not be used as a handy tool with which to justify or deny whole brain-death and 
organ transplantation. 
Japanese Views of Death 
A third major objection to whole brain-death and organ transplantation in 
Japan is that it is incompatible with traditional Japanese views of life and death. 
This argument consists of three major claims: (1) death is a vague and uncertain 
process; (2) the Japanese people have a distinctive view of a dead human body; 
and (3) they also possess a naturalistic perception of life and death. 
Death as a Vague and Uncertain process  
Japanese people traditionally view death as a process which has no clear 
beginning and ending. It is regarded as a vague and uncertain process that takes 
time. According to Feldman, the Japanese believe that the soul of the deceased is 
contaminated by death for forty-nine days. During this period, appropriate 
ceremonies are carried out by the family member to help the deceased make a 
  
smooth transition from the living-side to the ancestor-side. After forty-nine 
days, the deceased is finally regarded dead, but various ceremonies and offerings 
follow for many years. Because the concept of whole brain-death employs a 
number of medical criteria that draw sharp distinctions between life and death, 
Feldman rightly states that "it is not surprising, therefore, that it has encountered 
strong resistance from both the medical profession and the lay public in 
Japan." 44 
Nudeshima points out that the Japanese people regard both the beginning 
and the ending of life as a process. He quotes Yonemoto's description of the 
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Japanese view of the birth of a person, ("the image where one, who was in a 
vague and unfocused state, but had been gradually focused, and finally becomes 
a solid figure surfacing in group consciousness") and points out that death is also 
a process. It has two major parts: the extinction of personhood in this world, and 
the transformation and fixation of new personhood in the afterworld. 
Established social practices, such as funeral ceremonies and burial rituals, are 
employed by the family to make the whole process as smooth as possible. 
Because of this emphasis on death as a process, Nudeshima concludes that the 
Japanese are not comfortable with arguments that try to pinpoint the exact the 
moment of death. They are especially hesitant to draw a sharp line between life 
and death by using the criteria of whole brain-death.45  
Becker warns that adopting whole brain-death as a person's death could 
change the Japanese perception of this process and have serious side-effects. The 
most devastating outcome, he suggests, could be the psychological damage that 
might stem from the lack of opportunity to spend time with the dying person 
and to express sorrow and other feelings because of the hasty and demanding 
transplantation procedures. A concept of whole brain-death that presupposes 
organ transplantation could abnegate long-held Japanese views of death as a 
process, and may impose serious psychological harms upon those who 
survive.46 
Japanese Views Regarding the Dead Body  
One of the most common arguments in Japan against whole brain-death 
and organ-transplantation is that the Japanese put special meaning and value on 
the dead body of a beloved one. It is therefore helpful to explore what kind of 
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meaning and value the Japanese do put on the beloved one's dead body and 
how this distinctive view can influence their decisions about organ donation. 
This exploration can examine two bodies of evidence: Buddhist thought and the 
results of anthropological field research. 
Dogmatic Buddhism. In general, Buddhism can be categorized into 
Dogmatic Buddhism (Kyojyo Bukyo) and Applied Buddhism (Seikatu Bulcyo) 
according to Fujii.47 Dogmatic Buddhism consists of communities, dogmas, and 
  
rituals influencing each other; dogmas are represented and enacted in rituals 
which enhance a sense of togetherness in community. 
Fujii summarizes Buddhism as "the world-wide religion Which aims at 
liberation from life and death." He declares that there is no idea in Buddhism that 
requires adherence to the human body itself. He also suggests that there is a 
dogmatic teaching, "shasyin" (an act of abandoning oneself), which encourages 
people to forsake the egoistic self and to serve the Buddha and other people. 
"Shashin" is said to be modeled after the story of Yakuou-Bosatu who burnt 
  
himself to console the soul of the Buddha. This act of self-abandonment for the 
sake of others repeatedly appears in various Japanese folk stories and historical 
writings. For example, Fujii introduces one story from "Konjyaku-Monogatari," 
the largest collection of ancient legends in Japan: 
Once upon a time, there were a rabbit, a monkey, an otter, and a 
fox happily living together. One day a poor old man came to them, 
asking for something to eat. The monkey brought nuts, the otter 
brought fish, and the fox brought meat which he stole from a 
butcher shop. Because the rabbit only ate vegetables, he had 
nothing to bring to the man. The rabbit then asked the man to 
gather a woodpile, jumped into the flames, and offerred himself to 
the man. The flames went out as the old man lifted his hand. Then 
he announced that the dead rabbit was going to become the 
Buddha in the next world. The old man, as he extended his arms, 
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turned into "Teishyakuten" (a god who protects dogmas of 
Buddhism) and put force onto Himaraya, the end of this world. 
Then, blue liquid drooped down, and "Taisyakuten" used it to paint 
the rabbit on moon. This rabbit that we see on the moon is, in fact, 
the Buddha's former incarnation. (Note: Many Japanese perceive 
the shadow on the moon as a rabbit pounding rice cake.) 48  
Fujii concludes that "shashin" is regarded as the highest charity that a saint can 
possibly achieve. He suggests that the donation of organs can be regarded as 
  
one of the ultimate forms of "shashin." However he strongly emphasizes that 
concept of "shashin" never justifies a recipient's self-centered desire for organs to 
extend his or her life. Fujii argues that dogmatic Buddhism may justify organ 
donation, but does not necessarily justify organ reception. 
Given Dogmatic Buddhism's concept of self-abandonment, it is obvious 
that it puts little value in the body, whether living or dead. Fujii points out that 
Dogmatic Buddhism defines the body as a temporary place to host five kinds of 
knowledge: "fro" (color) that stands for material, "Jyu" (receiving) that stands for 
the perception process, "Sou" (image) that stands for the expression process, 
"Gyou" (deed) that stands for the will process, and "Shiki" (recognition) that 
stands for the recognition process. He regards 'the death of a person as the 
decomposition of these five forms of knowledge, leaving the temporal body 
empty. 
These views do not mean that one's body can be neglected. Instead, they 
require selfless integration of one's life and death with something bigger than 
the person. Dougen, a famous priest of historical Japanese Buddhism, regarded 
his life and death as of the Buddha, concluding that negligence of one's life and 
death directly meant negligence of Buddha's life and death. Thus, Buddhism 
holds that a person's life and death do not belong to the person's body or soul, 
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but to an existence bigger than human beings, such as the Buddha or Nature. 
From this perspective, death can be viewed as an ultimate reunion of the self 
with Nature or the Buddha. 
Buddhism believes there is no essential difference between life and death 
or a living body and a dead body. They are all same and equal because they are 
all part of the Buddha and Nature. Thus a body, whether it is living or dead is 
always important in terms of its relationship with the bigger existence. From 
these perspectives, Fujii insists that Buddhism can not accept whole brain-death 
because it sharply distinguishes life and death, or a living body and dead body, at 
some particular point. 
Dogmatic Buddhism aims at ultimate reunion with the Buddha and 
Nature through self-abandonment and charity toward others. It regards a brain-
dead body as an object of charity which requires ascetic self-renunciation from 
those who survive, such as the recipient, the recipient's family, and the donor's 
family. Fujii's point is that whole brain-death and 
valid and ethical only when a donor donates his 
motive to help others and a recipient receives the 
desire to survive. If a recipient desires organs for  
organ transplantation can be 
or her organ with a selfless 
rgan without a self-centered 
his or her own survival and 
wishes someone's death to achieve this, transplantation is deviated from the 
original concept of charity and becomes corrupted despite the donor's sincere 
desire to help others. 
Applied Buddhism. Dogmatic Buddhism influences people's lives through 
rituals and doctrines, but Applied Buddhism influences their everyday thoughts 
and behaviors. Fujii outlines the features of applied Buddhism as follows: (1) It is 
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different from the Buddhism found in India, China, and Korea; (2) Although 
Applied Buddhism has been directly influenced by Chinese and Korean 
Buddhism, it fused with native folk religion in Japan; and (3) Buddhism in Japan 
was incorporated into folk religion, losing some of its original teachings, but at 
the same time it also incorporating some elements of the native religions. The 
primary difference between Dogmatic and Applied Buddhism is that the first 
provides religious rituals and doctrines whereas the second receives and 
integrates them into people's lives. 
Fujii suggests that Applied Buddhism's perspective toward the body can 
be seen in the linguistic equivocality of the word "Kokoro" (mind). In the 
Japanese language, conditions of "Kokoro" (mind) are expressed by different 
parts of the body. For example, the Japanese use "Hara" (abdomen) to express 
various conditions of the mind such as anger, tolerance, honesty, evil 
mindedness, and so on. When they finally decide something difficult, the 
Japanese say "Hara wo kimeru" (literally, "decide on abdomen"), meaning one 
finally decided one's own way. In the same way, the Japanese also use different 
parts of the body to express conditions of one's mind such as the chest and the 
heart. These examples shows that from the Japanese perspective the mind 
resides not only in the brain or heart but also in all parts of the body. They 
perceive that mind and body are one united, sacred existence. 
This review of Dogmatic Buddhism and Applied Buddhism demonstrates 
that they influence Japanese's views toward the body in quite different ways. 
Dogmatic Buddhism, at the conscious level, provides ethical guidelines about 
how a body should be used. A body should be used to accomplish one's self- 
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abandonment, charity toward others, ultimate freedom from this world, and 
finally the reunion with the Buddha and Nature. In contrast, at the level of every 
day life and unconscious actions, Applied Buddhism provides mind-body 
monism; this, Fuji suggests, leads the Japanese to believe that a dead body is a 
sacred existence which possesses mind, will, and emotion. 
The Body and Interpersonal Relationship. On August 12, 1985, a Japan Air 
Line jumbo jet crashed into a mountain in Nagano prefecture on the way from 
Tokyo to Osaka, killing 520 people. The crash was so destructive that it was very 
difficult to recover the dead bodies from the site. However, many surviving 
family members desired to get to the site and tried to recover even small body 
parts of their beloved ones despite the difficulty of climbing up the mountain. At 
the temporary mortuary which was filled with the awful odors of dead bodies, 
the families intensely attempted to find their beloved one's bodies. 
Namihira, an eminent Japanese cultural anthropologist, examined the 
comments of the relatives of those who died in the crash and summarized the 
Japanese views toward, life, death, and the dead body in nine points.49 (1) The 
Japanese believe that the dead person's soul is still existing in a different realm 
that is called as 'the next world,' the other side,' and 'heaven.' (2) The Japanese 
perceive that the dead person's soul exists in an actuality that resembles our 
lives. They think that the soul has a physical body, eats, drinks, laughs and gets 
angry. Moreover, the soul also has the ability to perceive heat, coldness, and 
comfort the same way a living person does. (3) The Japanese believe that 
surviving family members, relatives, and close friends have obligations to get rid 
of situations that cause uncomfort, scarcity, and unsatisfacton to the dead 
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person's soul. They should alleviate any bitterness, chagrin, and anger the soul 
may feel, and help the soul to arrive at utopia. (4) After the surviving family 
confirms the dead body, the death of the person finally become definite. For the 
surviving family, the death of the beloved one does not happen until the dead 
body is found and confirmed. When the dead body is found, the surviving 
family feels glad, despite the fact that it confirms their beloved one's death, 
because the beloved one has been considered missing. (5) The Japanese believe 
that the dead person wants his or her family members to locate the unfound 
body. (6) The Japanese also believe that the dead person wants them to visit 
where he or she died and that such visiting is the only way to console the soul of 
the dead. (7) The Japanese believe that the dead person wants to return to his or 
her own house and that fulfilling this wish is an important obligation for the 
family. (8) Even when they bring the dead body back to their houses and 
perform funeral ceremonies, the Japanese believe that part of the soul remains at 
the death-site. (9) The Japanese believe that the dead body must be physically 
perfect. If not, it is better to have more rather than less parts of the body 
because the dead person may become handicapped in the afterworld or the dead 
person may feel sorrowful about missing parts of his or her body and condemn 
the person who caused it. 
These views toward the dead body suggests that the Japanese believe that 
the deceased individual continues to be a person who still has his or her 
personality, uniqueness, and dignity. More importantly, they also suggest that 
the Japanese hold that interpersonal relationships still exist between the deceased 
and surviving family members. These establish moral obligations similar to 
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those people usually have to living persons. Namihira points out that "the 
interpersonal relationship that the person had with other family members still 
exists in connection with the dead body even after the person has died."50 In this 
sense, the dead body symbolizes the deceased as if he or she continued to 
possesses personhood. It mediates between the deceased and the surviving 
family with an authentic sense of an on-going, mutual interpersonal relationship: 
"The family members of the dead do not cherish the dead's memory in an 
unilateral way, but the dead individual, in the form of the dead body, imposes 
certain demands on his or her surviving family members"51 says Namihira. 
Yanagida, a famous Japanese non-fiction writer, lost his second son to 
-whole brain-death. In his book "Gisei" ("sacrifice") Yanagida writes that he 
authentically perceived his son's brain-dead body talking back to him: 
When I and Kenichiro talked to Yojiro, though he was brain-dead, 
his body talked back to us. This was truly a mysterious experience. 
Probably this was a sense that can be understood only by members 
of a family who have shared happiness and sorrows with each 
other. Despite scientific explanations that a brain-dead person was 
literally a dead person who had no consciousness or senses, I 
became quite sure that the beloved one's brain-dead body meant a 
lot to the family members who had shared a spiritual life with each 
other.52 
This mysterious sense that the brain-dead body talks to the family may seem 
strange from a scientific standpoint. However, it appears to be an undeniable 
reality for some surviving relatives in Japan. For them, the brain dead body 
serves as the medium of continuing interpersonal relationship between the dead 
and the living; the brain-dead body still has a certain social role even after it loses 
consciousness. 
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This view suggests that the Japanese people have a distinctive concept of 
personhood that is different from the concept common in the West. The 
Japanese concept of personhood appears not to be limited to the presence of 
consciousness, but is extended and shared by significant others within the realm 
of interpersonal relationships. It appears that personhood from a Japanese's 
perspective can be defined as a sense of relatedness that is perceived and shared 
between at least two individuals. This differs from the view common in the West 
that defines personhood as individual consciousness. Thus, as long as a brain-
dead individual is perceived to possess relatedness with significant others, he or 
she is thought of as a person with full moral status. What matters most is not the 
degree of individual self-consciousness but the degree of relatedness experienced 
by those who surround and care for the deceased individual. 
Death Via Subjective Perceptions. Japanese use subjective perception as a 
way of understanding death. They hold that death must be perceivable through 
visual, auditory, tactual, and olfactory sensation. Yanagida writes about how the 
surviving family members are affected by their encounter with a brain-dead 
body: 
Finally, Kenichiro asked one question that surprised everyone in 
the room. "I wipe tears from my brother's eyes a lot, but he does 
not shed tears does he?" Dr. Tomioka was apparently puzzled by 
the question. "Well, this is a physiological phenomenon that does 
not mean he sheds tears. But we do not know why this happens" 
answered Dr. Tomioka. Even though it is only a physiological 
phenomenon, family members cannot help perceiving that he 
sheds tears because he is sad. I was touched by the question 
because it showed the elder brother's genuine caring for his 
younger brother.53 
From a medical perspective, such sheding of tears is nothing but a simple 
physiological phenomena; however, Yanagida's experience shows that tears can 
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mean more than that. They can mean sorrow and pain for those who see tears 
coming down from their beloved one's eyes. When we see a person shedding 
tears, we perceive that this person feels sorrow and pain. In the same way, 
Yanagida's elder son sees the tears in his younger brother's eyes and perceives 
that his brother is weeping as if he were still a living person. This example 
demonstrates that Japanese people use subjective sense perception to 
understand the existence of a person. It does not matter for the Japanese 
whether weeping is a physiological or psychological phenomena. As long as 
they see tears and perceive that a brain-dead person cries, the deceased 
individual continues to be a person in the web of relationships. 
Nakajima, a well known medical journalist and a writer, closely observed 
brain-dead patients and coined the term "Mienai-Shi" ("invisible death"). This 
suggests that brain-death is too hidden for Japanese family members to perceive. 
In the introductory chapter of her book, she tells the following story: 
During a five-month period of observing brain-dead patients in an 
Intensive Care Unit, there was one thing that caused me to feel 
very awkward: nobody in the family took the brain-dead person's 
hands or shed tears when told that the husband, wife, or beloved 
child was deceased. At first, I tried to convince myself that I 
happened to have people who were cold-minded, and very 
rational. But I came to understand that nobody, in fact, could 
perceive the reality of the beloved one's brain-death. Wearing 
white or blue antibacterial caps and masks, the family members 
stand bedside accompanied by life-sustaining machines and a 
respirator. A physician tries to explain brain death as simply as 
possible, but the family members only follow the machines and 
nod. They are almost absent-minded. Under these tense 
circumstances, they are not allowed to touch or to rub their 
beloved one's body, not to call his or her name while the physician 
is talking. The brain-dead person does not appear to be dead, but 
the physician shows that this is so. The family members can only 
try to understand with utmost effort that the person is really dead. 
With half-hearted minds, they do nothing but observe the beloved 
one until time runs out. However, without exception, these people 
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start crying intensely or shed tears calmly when the brain-dead 
person's heart stops beating and the respirator is taken off. At this 
moment, they finally realize the death of their beloved one.54 
Traditional death is easy for the Japanese to understand. Because it is "cold," 
"hard" and therefore "visible," it makes them realize that dead the person will 
never come back. To the contrary, Nakajima suggests that whole brain-death is 
too invisible to perceive for the ordinary Japanese people. This "invisible" brain-
death is, Nakajima insists, "death in conception" that can be perceived only by 
those who get used to observing it, persons such as physicians and other 
healthcare professionals. Nakajima's story demonstrates the fact that the 
Japanese recognize death by the exterior appearance of the body rather than by 
internal medical conditions. For ordinary Japanese people, the perception of 
sensory information is a more reliable basis for recognizing death than medical 
information. 
The Japanese Ethics of Relationships 
A fourth major objection to whole brain-death and organ transplantation 
in Japan is that it is incompatible with the traditional Japanese ethics of 
relationships. It is therefore appropriate (1) to review the Japanese ethics of 
relationships, and (2) to explore how it influences the feelings of Japanese people 
toward whole brain-death criteria and organ transplantation. 
Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism 
Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism each contributes to the Japanese 
ethics of relationships. Shinto is the indigenous "naturally-occurring" religion of 
Japan. It has no historical originator, and it has continued to alter itself in order 
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to co-exist with foreign religions such as Buddhism and Confucianism. Shinto 
originated in mythology and festivities that developed among the Japanese in 
ancient times. Under the influence of "rice culture," people think that mythical 
gods have power to cause natural disasters.55 They therefore experience a sense 
of reverent awe toward nature. As a result, Shinto is a religion which "fosters a 
sense of immersion in nature" and puts low-emphasis on the individual.56 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Buddhism emphasizes idea of 
separation from this world, life, and death. It denies the egotistic self and 
emphasizes relatedness with an existence bigger than human beings. 
Confucianism has much influence not only in China but also in Korea, 
Vietnam, and Japan. One of the essential moral teachings of Confucianism is 
"jinrin." The Japanese dictionary defines the word as follows: (1) "an order of 
relationship between persons," and (2) "the path of righteousness which a 
person should follow for the sake of being a person."57 Moushi, a Confucian 
philosopher of ancient China, is said to be the originator of "jinrin." He proposed 
that there are five essential moral standards or duties: "Shin "Gi," "Betu," "Jyo," 
and "Shin." Each of them occurs in particular relationships, such as the 
relationships between father and son, ruler and allegiant, husband and wife, 
older and younger brother, and friends. For instance, "Gi" implies a moral 
standard to encourage a static order between ruler and allegiant. Confucianism, 
thus, defines a person as a unique entity born within "Jinrin" or relationships. 
This indicates that Confucianism regards the person's moral existence primarily 
as a social entity in a web of relationships.58 
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The primary religions of Japan (Shinto, Buddhism, and Confucianism) 
emphasize relationships in different ways. Shinto's emphasis on nature and 
Buddhism's suppression of the egoistic self result in a low emphasis on the 
individual. In addition, Confucianism identifies moral duties based on 
relationships. It emphasizes that a person exists as a collective rather than as an 
individual entity and that therefore it is important to foster peaceful and proper 
relationships with others. 
Ethics as the "Study of Relationships"  
In the Japanese language, there are many words that signify relationships. 
However, "ningen" is the best example to show that in Japanese society a 
person's existence is viewed as essentially relational. Although there are two 
Japanese words, "hito" and "ningen," that can be translated as "person" in 
English, they define a person in different ways. A Japanese dictionary defines 
"hito" as follows: (1) a living creature whose existence is differentiated from other 
living creatures because it has a developed brain, and has the capacity to use 
language, fire, and tools and (2) a person who constitutes a society, or an 
individual.59 
On the contrary, "ningen" used to be defined as "a place where persons 
live"60 The word, "ningen" is made of two Chinese characters (").1111") while the 
word "hito" is made of one (")."). As is evident, the character "A." is 
incorporated in "ningen" with another Chinese character "111" which literally 
means "betweenness." Therefore the word "ningen" can be literally translated as 
"between persons" or more simply "relationships." Therefore, it can be assumed 
that "a place where persons live" is relational and that "ningen" is originally 
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meant the relationships in which persons live. Then the word "ningen" 
gradually came to acquire a new meaning. Now it is defined as "a person who 
has certain relationships with others to form a society and who are expected to 
make contributions to a society." Taking these meanings of "ningen" into an 
account, it can be inferred that the Japanese regard relationships as the most 
essential aspects of person's existence. 
Watuji is the first philosopher in Japan formally to explore the ethics that 
emphasizes relationships. Correctly observing that the word "ningen" indicates 
relationships, he was the first person who called "finrin" what is called "ethics" in 
English.61 
He proposes that a person consists of two aspects: an individual and the 
whole. An individual and the whole form double negative relationships. An 
individual can exists only when it denies the whole, but then the individual must 
deny itself to come back to the whole. Watuji concludes that each individual 
should be integrated into a nation, the ultimate moral whole, which he believes 
completes and actualizes the individual's personhood. 
Watuji regards ethics as a study of relationships. He understands that 
central features of the Japanese moral life lie in relationships where special moral 
standards motivate the Japanese people to behave ways that preserve peaceful 
and orderly interactions.62 
Benedict, a prominent American anthropologist, suggested that the 
Japanese have an ethics that is different from the ethics in the West.63 She points 
out that the Japanese do not have canonical moral rules or principles, like the 
categorical imperative or the golden rule in the Western ethics. What makes an 
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action moral or immoral depends, according to Benedict, on a "circle." Based 
upon intensive interviews of Japanese immigrants, she reports that there are 
several moral codes, such as chu, ko, gin, and jin, connecting one person to 
another to form a "circle" image of web-like interpersonal relationships among 
Japanese people. One is expected to understand that "each move has its 
consequences"so that one should estimate "all the factors involved in the 
situation and do nothing that" disturbs the circle of relationships. One is 
required to have "watchfulness of all the cues one observes in other people's 
acts, and a strong sense that other people are sitting in judgment." Failing to do 
so results in a strong sense of shame, which she defines as "a reaction to other 
people's criticism." She defines Japanese culture as a "shame culture" and 
contrast it with a "guilt culture" which have "absolute standards of morality and 
relies on men's developing a conscience." 
Becker, correctly realizing that Japanese morality is firmly embedded in 
web of relationships, points out that "what to eat, what to wear, where to work, 
and how to speak can be determined by one's relationship with the surrounding 
people in Japan while they can be freely determined by one's own preference in 
Western society. "64 The desirable consequence of the ethics of relationships is to 
achieve peaceful, proper, and orderly equilibrium in a web of interpersonal 
relationships. 
The ethics of relationships does not have absolute moral standards. 
Instead, it should be regarded as situational and consequential. For different 
relationships, different moral standards are employed in a cons.equentialist 
approach. This requires the Japanese people to engage in a moral pause that 
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enables them to foresee how their actions will impact others. They are to weigh 
the different options and choices that one can take and to make a moral decision 
that will not disturb peaceful and orderly equilibrium in a web of interpersonal 
relationships. In this process, different moral principles, rules, and standards are 
employed to justify one's action with great flexibility. This is why the Japanese 
people sometimes think and act in difficult and even inconsistent ways from the 
viewpoint of those in the West. 
Fetters reports that the Japanese people respect what is called "family 
autonomy" more than individual autonomy in the medical decision-making 
process. His study of the history of the family in Japan suggests that the current 
family system in Japan has its roots in the Edo period (1600-1868 AC). It holds 
that the head of the household possesses absolute authority. Each member of 
the family is expected to live each day without doing something that endangers 
its continued well being. Thus, obeying the head of the family becomes the 
highest moral duty. The family rather than the individual is the most important 
social and political unit in Japan. 
Given this historical evidence, Fetters proposes family autonomy as a 
predominant principle for the Japanese medical decision-making process. "The 
essence of this principle," he says, "is that a common, socially sanctioned pattern 
of decision making is for the family to make decisions for other members of the 
family, regardless of the individual family member's competency."65  
From the perspective of the ethics of relationships,"the cancer disclosure 
paradox" can be interpreted as follows. If one perceives that disclosing the truth 
will imposes a serious psychological burden onto the family member, despite the 
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fact one may want to be told the truth if one gets cancer, one should not tell the 
family member the truth. Concealment of this important medical information is 
morally justified. The family members automatically foresee the consequences 
of the disclosure of cancer to the patient and use them to judge whether the 
disclosure is the morally right thing to do. The innate moral nature of truth 
disclosure or truth concealment is not the most important consideration for the 
Japanese. What matters most is the probable consequences and their probable 
impact on interpersonal relationships. 
The Ethics of Relationships and Brain-Death  
Given the distinctive characteristics of the ethics of relationships, the 
imperative question must be stated as follows: how does this approach make it 
difficult for the Japanese people to accept whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation? The works of two Japanese philosophers' are helpful in 
answering this question. 
Shared Whole Brain-Death. Morioka points out that the Japanese use the 
word "shinda-hito" which means "a dead person" in English.66 However, 
according to many definitions of personhood in the West, "shinda-hito" is a 
contradictory term: a dead individual cannot be a "person" because a "person" 
must be living and have what makes a "person" unique, consciousness, the 
capacity to decide and so on. Morioka points out that the Japanese often use this 
term in their daily lives without any sense of contradiction. This indicates that a 
dead body is still regarded as a living person for many Japanese people. For the 
Japanese family, a brain-dead body is more than a body without brain functions. 
It is a beloved person with whom the family shares life and history. 
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Morioka proposes that the essence of the whole brain-death debate lies in 
the encounter between a brain-dead person and others. He defines whole brain-
death as an occasion in which a brain-dead person and others encounter, 
influence, and interact with each other. He calls this "a place of brain-death," 
which indicates that brain-death should be understood as a circumstance that 
includes both the brain-dead person and the others who observe and care for 
him or her. In this setting, a brain-dead person and others continue to have 
intimate interpersonal relationship which require etiquette and courtesy. 
Morioka emphasizes that the lack of such shared etiquette and courtesy in "a 
place of brain-death" causes confusion and chaos. He asserts that the final 
resolution of the controversy will require helping Japanese society establish 
shared moral roles and etiquette in circumstances of whole brain-death.67  
Two implications of Morioka's work are worthy of emphasis. First, he 
correctly points out that there is a continuing relationship between a brain-dead 
person and others accompanied with a unique ethics which he calls "etiquette 
and courtesy." Another contribution of his work is his unique concept of brain-
death. He proposes that the definition of brain-death should not be limited to a 
patient's clinical condition. Instead, he extends the scope of the meaning of 
brain-death by conceptualizing it as an event shared by the patient, family, 
healthcare professionals and others. 
Resonant Death. Komatu points out that in Japan the most problematic 
idea of accepting whole brain-death as the death of a person is the idea that 
death only belongs to the dying individual. However, Komatu asserts, this view 
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completely misses the fact that death has been an event shared by others 
throughout the entire history of the world.68 
Based upon Aries' study of death in medieval times, Komatu coins the 
term "reasonant death." There are three characteristics of resonant death. First, it 
is a process that is marked by the flow of various events from the premonition 
of one's coming death to burial. Second, the most important features of 
resonant death are not its medical and biological criteria but the social experience 
that is initiated, shared and sustained by others with death-rituals such as 
farewell ceremonies before and after one leaves this world. Third, resonant 
death penetrates observers such that the death of someone else becomes the 
observer's own death. Resonant death does not belong to only one individual; it 
overtakes the dying individual and it engulfs and penetrates others. Komatu 
compares resonant death to several sounding bodies with the same frequency 
which start to resonate in sequence to produce harmonies.69 
This idea of resonant death leads to a distinction between its two aspects. 
In general, death can be defined as a condition of someone's absolute non-
existence in this world. However, since resonant death implies that someone's 
death can be shared and experienced by others, it is possible that death can also 
be defined subjectively from the observer's viewpoint in relationships. 
An analogy may help some to understand Komatu's reasonant death 
more fully. Let us imagine that you are born alone on an island. There are no 
other human beings or any other form of living creatures on this island. In this 
hypothetical situation, you happen to have a small stone and you are asked one 
question: "how can you be sure that this small stone that you have really 
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happens and exists in this world?" The question appears to be silly because you 
can see, touch, and feel it and thus be able to conclude that it really does exist. 
Now let us change the question little bit. How can you make sure that your 
death really happens in this world? Now suddenly the question becomes more 
difficult to answer for two reasons. First, it would be very difficult for you to 
know what death is all about. Why? Because you have never had a chance to 
observe it. We, human beings, must observe the death of others in order to 
formulate and define it. Death is only defined through our observations. 
Second, it would also be very difficult for you to know whether your own death 
really happened. If you are not yet dead, you have not yet experienced your 
death and therefore you are not able to confirm it that really took place. On the 
other hand, when you are really dead, you are gone, which means that you also 
cannot confirm that you have died. You need someone to watch your death in 
order for that person to confirm that your death really happens. Death is 
essentially and primarily a social event that must be observed and shared by 
others. 
"Keshi-No-Mino-Iryo"  
Yamaguchi, a Japanese physician, proposes "Keshi-No-Mino-hyo" ("care of 
poppy seeds") that emphasizes relationships. He uses one case of brain-death to 
depict how this approach can be applied in healthcare settings. Yuki, a nine year 
old girl, was involved in an accident when she rode in a car her mother drove. 
Despite much effort to save her, she became dead according to whole brain-
death criteria. As the attending physician, Yamaguchi came to Yuki's father, who 
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was a Buddhist monk, to discuss treatment plans. Yuki's father asked 
Yamaguchi to do "Keshi-No-Mitui-Iryo:" 
Mr. Sadamichi looked down and listened to me, then he faced up 
and said this. "Doctor, we really appreciate that you understand 
and respect our feelings. During this period of nine days, we have 
seen the changes in our daughter and we are starting to 
understand that she may not make it. You have won our 
confidence during this time. So, please do whatever you think is 
best for Yuki. We will follow your guidance. However, I think that 
care is not only to be given to the patient. From this standpoint, 
care is very similar to what Buddhists preach that we should 
deliver. In the case of Yuki, there is a mother who truly regrets 
that she harmed her daughter. I want you to provide care for her. 
Do you know the story of Keshi-No-Mi (poppy seeds) ? A mother 
comes to the Buddha and asks 'Please bring back my beloved 
child's life.' The Buddha says to the mother. 'You need poppy 
seeds. They must come from a home where none of family 
members die.' In vain, the mother tries to find such poppy seeds, 
and comes back to the Buddha. However, by that time, she 
realizes the reality of her child's death. What I would like you to do 
is this 'Keshi-No-Mi-No-Iryo' ("care of poppy seeds"). I 
understand that my daughter is not going to make it. But we just 
cannot give up our hope till the last moment. Please understand 
this feeling and provide the best care for my daughter. I truly 
believe that this will be a precious lesson for your philosophy as a 
clinician." I was surprised by the father's remarks because, at the 
bottom of my mind I expected him to say, "Please terminate care 
because it is doing nothing but hurting my daughter." But I decided 
to respect Mr. Sadamichi's suggestion and left the room.70 
During the next twenty-nine days, under the "care of poppy seeds," Doctor 
Yamaguchi observed that the facial expressions of Yuki's mother softened. 
Sometimes she smiled and talked proudly about her daughter. He began to 
believe in the care of poppy seeds, the care for family members. 
When Yuki's heart stop beating, her parents peacefully accepted their 
daughter's death. When the mother was cleaning her daughter's body, she 
sometimes smiled and talked with the nurses. At the end of the cleaning service, 
Yamaguchi heard her express her last farewell to her daughter: "I am very sorry 
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Yuki, but you tried very hard to live. Thank you." Yamaguchi expressed his 
sentiment as follows: "I felt that I could not save Yuki's little life, but I could save 
other life."71 Yamaguchi provided care of poppy seeds and saved the mother's 
life by giving her plenty of time to sort out her painful feelings and to receive the 
consolation and peace necessary for accepting her daughter's death. 
Five years after Yuki died, Yamaguchi met Yuki's father who had the 
following recollection: 
After Yuki died, we began contemplating more about issues of 
death. From our religious perspectives, death does not occur at 
the point when a heart stops beating. Even more, death does not 
occur at brain-death. Rather, death is finalized and completed after 
it is shared and remembered by others when they spend a night 
with the body. After the burial, there are several rituals such as 
"Oshichinichi," "shijyu-kunichi" and "Isyu-ki" which help the 
survivors to console the hard feelings of those who still can not 
give up the dead person. These religious rituals, I think, might be a 
natural and traditional scenery which wisely reflects the mental 
action (psychology) of human beings. If someone's death is not 
accepted by others in the natural way, misfortune will happen 
again. After we lost our daughter, one of our neighbors also lost 
their beloved son. The father killed himself after several months. 
When we heard it, we talked with each other that "we were saved 
because of the 39 days. Yuki, our daughter, gave us the period in 
order for us to sort out our feelings.72 
Sadamichi, Yuki's father, beautifully defines religious rituals as ultimate 
wisdom needed to help people accept and complete the death of beloved one. 
This also implies that for Japanese death is a process rather than an instant event 
and that is shared and co-experienced by others. The case also suggests how 
important it is for Japanese people to be with the dead. The family members 
may not need medical prescriptions, but the care of poppy seeds insists that they 
also need ample attention and consolation from healthcare professionals. 
53 
Yamaguchi says why he was motivated to write the book "I have seen 
that many ethics committees start to advocate whole brain-death without paying 
attention to those who oppose to it. The family members of the brain-dead 
patient, the healthcare professionals who care for the brain-dead patient, and the 
brain-dead patient are totally ignored in the movement of whole brain-death 
organ transplantation."73 The care of poppy. seeds that Yamaguchi proposes can 
not afford to ignore the patient's family members because it embraces the ethics 
of relationships which tries to fulfill the needs of family members to have 
ongoing, intimate relationship with the deceased patient. 
The ethics of relationships, which is deeply integrated in Japanese life, 
makes it difficult for the Japanese to give up their sense of hope and obligation 
toward the brain-dead. They often believe that whole brain-death criteria 
hastens their beloved one's death against their will.74 
Negative effects can result from deaths that feel hastened to others. Once 
the family members agree to donate organs, the entire procedure can start to 
shift towards transplantation. Suddenly the room is filled with medical 
professionals, and family members are not allowed to approach the deceased 
which makes the relatives feel neglected and abandoned.75 Some feel guilt, 
confusion, and anger. 
In addition, hastened death can cause family members to think that their 
beloved one's human rights were seriously neglected.76 Some believe that the 
brain-dead deserve society's protection because they are weak figures in society 
who still have human rights but do not have any means to advocate it.77  
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Summary 
This chapter has examined four main reasons why it is said that whole 
brain-death criteria are incompatible with Japanese society. The first is that they 
cannot establish a person's death because the Japanese define it not according to 
medical facts but according to social relationships. The second point is that it is 
impossible to determine societal consensus in Japan on this issue. The third point 
is that traditional Japanese views toward life and death are incompatible with 
whole brain-death criteria. The fourth point is that whole brain-death criteria for 
the purpose of organ-transplantation is incompatible with the Japanese ethics 
that emphasizes relationships. The more ongoing and more intimate the 
relationships are between family members and the deceased, the more probable 
it is that family members will perceive him or her a living person and the less 
likely it is that they will accept whole brain-death criteria with respect to their 




The Ethics of Relationships: 
Exposition 
The last chapter examined the most frequent arguments in Japan against 
accepting whole brain-death as a person's death. The common speculation is 
that, because of a view of death which is thought to be incompatible with whole 
brain-death criteria, Japanese people tend to think of those who satisfy these 
standards as still living. This makes it virtually impossible in Japan to procure 
organs from a brain-dead person for organ transplantation. The previous 
chapter then suggested that actually the ethics of relationships is the fundamental 
factor that encourages these attitudes among Japanese people. The claim is that, 
not whole brain-death criteria as such, but the ethics of relationships ultimately 
prevents Japanese people from donating organs. This chapter, using the ethics 
of relationships as a guidepost, explores in even more detail why adopting organ 
transplantation in Japanese society is very difficult. 
A Missing Element in 
the Japanese Controversy 
In 1968, the same year that the first Japanese heart transplantation took 
place, Yoko Terao was born with severe congenital heart disease. Despite many 
medical difficulties, her mother helped Terao go to school and to enjoy her 
education. However, in 1986, her condition became worse and she was forced to 
withdraw from her high school. In 1988, she suffered from several attacks which 
56 
made her condition even worse, leaving heart-lung simultaneous transplantation 
the only way to save her life. When she was told this grim prognosis, she 
suddenly remembered the Wada heart transplantation which ironically had 
taken place the same year she was born. She agonized about the fate that 
required her to seek for the same organ transplantation to save her life. Ever 
since she was little, she had experienced ambivalent feelings toward organ 
transplantation. Sometimes she was anxious; nevertheless, she was still hopeful 
that she eventually would receive an organ transplantation in the United States 
and get better. However, when she was informed of her poor prognosis, and of 
her more immediate need of transplantation, she began to think about the 
meaning of existence and came to believe that there ought to be a purpose for 
her difficult life. Hoping that she could contribute to the medical development of 
organ transplantation in her nation, she chose to wait for an organ 
transplantation in Japan instead of going aboard. When she turned twenty, 
however, she desired to become an independent and healthy woman so that she 
could take care of her mother and have a full and fruitful life. Therefore, she 
changed her mind about receiving an organ transplantation abroad and started 
fund-raising by writing and publishing essays. But then she felt that people 
regarded her change of mind as "selfish and self-centered." Seeking for the right 
thing to do, she began to read books about whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation. After a long struggle, she finally decided not to pursue organ-
transplantation at all. She explains how she reached this conclusion as follows: 
One day, my mother, while reading a newspaper, said with eager 
expression that "if I become brain-dead, I would like to donate my 
organs." At that time I finally realized that I had ignored the most 
important thing: I was about to collect somebody's well- 
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intentioned fund-raising, go abroad and receive organ 
transplantation that was based on somebody's death. If my 
mother becomes brain-dead, as long as I can feel my mother's 
heartbeat, her body warmth, she is still my 'living mother' and I 
want to stay with my mother who looks like she is sleeping. 
Although she becomes cold, I want to stay forever with my mother 
whom I trust most. Among organ transplantation advocates, some 
say that 'organ-donation is love.' I, too, think that it is 'great love' 
in one sense, but as long as I continue to feel that I could not agree 
to donate my mother's organs if she became brain-dead, my desire 
to seek for organ-transplantation is nothing but an egoistic, self-
centered desire of which I truly feel very ashamed. I decided to 
end this trembling feeling and realized that I needed courage to 
decline [organ transplantation]."78 
What triggered Terao's drastic change in attitude toward whole brain-
death and organ transplantation? She writes that she tried to imagine that her 
mother became brain-dead and she asked herself whether she would be willing 
to donate her mother's organs. Terao concludes that she would not agree to 
donate her mother's organs because she could not perceive her mother as dead 
even if her condition satisfied whole brain-death criteria. 
Terao experienced a shift in her standpoints from the recipient's to the 
donor's side. After she consciously imagined what she would do if her mother 
were brain-dead, she was able to put herself into the donor's standpoint and see 
whole brain-death and organ transplantation from a new and different angle. 
The result was a complete turn-around in her attitudes. Even though she needed 
life-saving organ transplantation, she decided not to pursue it because she now 
realized that whole brain-death cannot be the death of a person. 
Terao's experience suggests several things. Clearly, whether one accepts 
the concept of whole brain-death may not depend solely on one's philosophical, 
religious, and cultural beliefs. The important factors that caused Terao's change 
in attitude toward whole brain-death and organ transplantation included 
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intimate feelings and love for her mother which were firmly embedded in their 
intimate relationship. 
It is extremely difficult to maintain both viewpoints of what it would be 
like to become a donor and a donor's family or a recipient and a recipient's 
family like Terao did. It appears very difficult for the Japanese to realize the pain 
and agonies experienced by both those on the donor side and those on the 
recipient side. In the Japanese arguments for and against whole brain-death and 
organ-transplantation, this is what is consistently lacking. Assuming the 
viewpoints of both the donor side and the recipient side and striving to attain 
mutual understanding between the two is rare. It is as if there were a huge 
"wall" standing between the donor side and the recipient side preventing people 
from understanding and helping each other. This "wall" between the donor side 
and the recipient side is the ultimate factor that prevents the Japanese people 
from donating organs and hampers organ transplantation from taking root in 
Japanese society. 
The Ethics of Relationships: 
Conceptual Analysis 
The most fundamental belief of the ethics of relationships is that the 
essence of a person's existence is constituted by relationships. There are three 
types of relationships that define a person: first-person relationships, second-
person relationships, and third-person relationships. Each of the three types of 
relationships is as important as the other two in constituting a person. 
Three Types of Relationships  
The ethics of relationships defines first-person relationship as 
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"relationships with oneself." First-person relationships are those we 
hypothetically conceive in our minds. One can think of oneself as an 
independent entity that exists in one's mind and have a hypothetical relationship 
with it. A good example of a first-person relationship is the concept of self-image 
in psychology. There is common agreement that we human beings have various 
self-images in our minds. Although these self-images are created by ourselves, 
they are considerably influenced by outer factors, such as other people's 
judgments. The ethics of relationships views such self-images as one form of 
having relationships. Another example, which can be taken from ethics, is the 
sense of integrity. In ethics, integrity is considered to be one of the ethical 
virtues which means, according to Beauchamp and Childress, "soundness, 
reliability, wholeness, and integration" of one's moral character.79 The ethics of 
relationships proposes that the moral sense of integrity can be also viewed as a 
conscious monitoring of one's moral self, as if one is having a relationship with 
the objectively monitored self and is constantly judging one's fidelity toward 
moral rules and principles. 
Second-person relationships are defined as "relationships between you 
and me." This is very close to what we usually experience in our real lives. 
These relationships typically develop between husbands and wives, parents and 
children, brothers and sisters, and close friends. In addition, relationships 
between strangers can be also transformed to second-person relationship as 
people spend more time together. Such relationships tend to occur between 
teacher and student, or physician and patient. 
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Third-person relationships can be defined as "relationships between 
strangers" through laws, social rules, and moral norms in society. For example, 
we usually form a line to buy a ticket at a movie theater because there are certain 
social rules for such things which are shared by us and others. We unconsciously 
or consciously perceive the existence of strangers and feel motivated not to cause 
trouble but to live more peacefully with them by obeying laws, social rules, and 
moral norms. This demonstrates that we often have undetected but still 
mutually interpersonal relationships with strangers. 
The ethics of relationships reveals that the existence of a person can be 
defined from three different directions. First-person relationships allow us to 
define a person as a single, individual, and independent entity that is perceived in 
self-consciousness. Second-person relationships allow us to capture a person as a 
dependent and interrelated existence. Third-person-relationships allow us to 
regard a person as a public and social being that constitutes group, community, 
and nation. 
Ethical Theories and Principles in Relationships  
Based upon the three different relationships that constitute a person, the 
ethics of relationships proposes that different ethical theories and principles can 
be categorized. Three broad categories of ethical principles and theories can be 
identified: first-person ethics, second-person ethics, and third-person ethics. 
Ethics of the first-person can be defined as a group of ethical theories and 
principles that are frequently employed in first-person relationships. Moral 
agents in first-person relationships focus upon self-consciousness and self-image. 
The moral standards tend to depend on what one believes the moral right or 
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wrong thing to do is. The principle of autonomy can be regarded an ethics of 
the first-person because it encourages the individual self to be a self-governing 
being who chooses his or her own moral position and accepts responsibility for 
his or her own choices and actions. Kant's deontology can be also categorized as 
a moral theory of first-person relationships because Kant's moral duty emerges 
from an individual's pure reason: "I ought never act except in such a way that I 
can also will that my maxim should become a universal law."8° Some types of 
virtue ethics are examples of ethics of first-person relationships because it strives 
to attain the individual's virtuous character. 
In second-person ethics, moral theories and principles emerge from 
second-person relationships. The principle of beneficence, feminism, and the 
ethics of care can be categorized and generaized as ethics of the second-person 
because of their emphasis upon sympathy, compassion, fidelity, love, friendship, 
and sensitivity toward the needs of others. 
As indicated earlier, traditional Japanese ethics, jinrin, is a moral theory of 
second-person ethics. As discussed before, jinrin identifies five close and intimate 
relationships as the most fundamental contexts of moral experience. Keeping 
peace and order among those relationships is jinrin's interpretation of what it 
means to be moral. The five special relationships are parent-child, king-
feudatory, husband-wife, brother-sister, and friend-friend. All are second-
person relationships. 
Also, the Japanese principle of "family autonomy" is also a moral principle 
of second-person ethics because it allows patients and family members to form 
dependent relationships with each other and share autonomous medical 
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decision-making. The ethics of relationships can explain why the "cancer-
disclosure-paradox" occurs. As Fetters points out, it is unclear why the Japanese 
people say more than one thing regarding the disclosure of a diagnosis of cancer: 
each wants to be told that he or she has the disease, but none wants to tell other 
family members. However, from the perspective of the ethics of relationships, it 
is evident that the two different attitudes stem from different moral principles. 
When one wants to be told that he or she has cancer, one engages the principle 
of autonomy derived from ethics of the first-person. However, when one does 
not want a family member to be told the truth, one now uses different ethical 
principles, especially the principle of "family autonomy" derived from second-
person ethics. This paradox is a good example of how the Japanese people 
employ different moral theories and principles depending on their relationships. 
It also highlights the essential difference between the principle of autonomy of 
the West and that in Japan. The principle of autonomy of the West is an 
expression of first-person ethics. That of Japan emerges from the ethics of the 
second-person. They both emphasize autonomy. However, the West 
emphasizes the autonomy of the individual while Japanese society emphasizes 
the autonomy of the family. 
In third-person ethics, ethical theories and principles emerge from third-
person relationships. The principles of justice, equality, and utility are 
expressions of third-person ethics. When we face strangers, we find it more 
difficult to feel compassion and obligation toward them. Because of this lack of 
intimacy, we tend to become more selfish and unethical. Third-person ethics is 
especially important because it reminds us that, although we do not have 
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intimate relationships with strangers, we still have certain moral responsibilities 
toward them. Third-person ethics instructs us how to deal and live with 
strangers peacefully. For instance, the principle of justice suggests that strangers 
must share "fair, equitable, and appropriate treatment in light of what is due or 
owed to persons."81 Utilitarianism also tells us that we sometimes need to be 
selfless, impartial, and more group-oriented to seek the maximum benefit for the 
community to which we belong. 
Relationships and Perceptions of Brain Death 
The ethics of relationships further proposes that whole brain-death can be 
perceived differently depending on which type of relationship one emphasizes. 
Yanagida is one of those who propose that there are three types of death: first-
person death, second-person death, and third-person death.82 
According to Yanagida, first-person death can be defined as "my own 
death." Advanced medical directives, for instance, indicate how one wants to be 
treated near the end of one's own life. One needs to imagine what is expected to 
happen in the future and to decide whether being declared dead according to 
whole brain criteria is acceptable to oneself. Therefore, from this perspective, 
whole brain-death is regarded as a matter to be accepted or rejected in light of 
one's own autonomous values and beliefs. 
Second-person death is that of a spouse, parent, child, brother, sister, 
boyfriend, or girlfriend. Because of the unreplaceable memories and intimate 
relationships, second-person death often evokes nonrational, subjective, and 
impractical feelings and emotions among Japanese people. This is often 
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experienced as a very emotional and difficult event, one that is not conducive to 
discussions of whole brain-death and organ transplantation. 
Yanagida points out that third-person death is an objective event that can 
be calmly observed from a stranger's standpoint. "Even if five young people die 
in a traffic accident or a million people die in Africa, we can still sleep well at night 
and our lives today and tomorrow do not change at all," wrote Yanagida. The 
clinical criteria for whole brain-death are examples of third-person death. The 
personality and history of the deceased are irrelevant considerations. What 
matters most of all is the time and cause of brain-death. 
The ethics of relationships therefore believes that a person ought to be 
understood through three important relationships: first-person relationships, 
second-person relationships and third-person relationships. Persons employ 
different sets of ethical theories and principles, and they perceive brain-death 
differently, depending which of these three types of relationships they make 
primary. 
The "Wall" Between Donors 
and Recipients in Japan 
Having reviewed the ethics of relationships in Japan, we are now able to 
examine organ transplantation in Japanese society. This discussion follows the 
diagram found in the appendix. 
This diagram has two sides, the donor side and the recipient side, with 
various relationships within and across them both. There are two different kinds 
of arrows in the diagram: the bold arrows indicate more intimate second-person 
relationships and the dotted arrows indicate less intimate third-person 
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relationships. The relationships are more close and intimate on the longitudinal 
axis because they are second-person-relationships. On the lateral axis, the 
relationships between the donor and the recipient sides are less intimate and 
visible because they are third-person relationships. Those on each of the two 
sides end up concentrating their attention on their own second-person 
relationships. 
For the donor's family, the death of the donor is a second-person death 
while the death of the recipient is a third-person death. This makes it difficult for 
the donor's family to think about the recipient's need for organs. In a similar 
fashion, for the recipient's family members, the death of the recipient is a second-
person death while that of the donor is a third-person death. This makes it 
difficult for family members of recipients to conceive the pain and agony that the 
donor's family members face. Therefore, relationships between those on the 
donor side and those on the recipient side, which ought to be the central part of 
organ-transplantation, become weak and distant. Each side become more 
indifferent and negligent toward the other. The metaphor of the "wall" is an apt 
to illustration of this special circumstance between those on the donor and the 
recipient sides. 
Barriers Between Donors and Recipients  
A wall is an object that prevents one from seeing what is on its other side. 
This is exactly what this "wall" does for organ transplantation in Japan. It 
prevents those on the donor side and those on the recipient side from 
understanding each other. Because his or her relatives love the donor so much, 
they simply cannot think of the recipient's needs. They therefore lack 
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motivation to donate organs. Because the recipient's family and physicians really 
love and wish to save the recipient's life, they simply cannot imagine the painful 
reality of the donor's relatives. The "wall" implies unconscious indifference 
toward the other side's welfare. It illustrates a state of mind which is completely 
filled with a strong desire to help one's own relative, so strong that one becomes 
blind to the pain, agony, hope, and needs of those on the opposite side. The 
general rule appears to be that the more intimate one's relationship is with a 
donor or a recipient, the more indifferent and blind one becomes toward the 
welfare of those on the other side of the "wall." 
This "wall" becomes even taller and thicker as both sides develop 
different concepts of whole brain-death and employ different types of ethical 
theories. For the recipient side, the whole brain-death of the donor is third-
person death. As such it evokes no strong emotions and feelings. When these 
on the recipient side think of the donor, they are able to think of whole brain-
death criteria calmly and rationally. They employ third-person ethics, such as 
respect for the autonomy of strangers (in the case of organ donation) and 
utilitarianism (in the case of organ transplantation). At the same time, when they 
think of their beloved recipient, they employ second-person ethics, such as the 
principle of beneficence and the ethics of care. In this mode, the most important 
goal is to save the recipient's life. This goal justifies everything, including 
legalizing whole brain-death as a person's death despite the fact that many 
Japanese people are still opposed to these criteria. 
On the other hand, for those on the donor side, the death of the donor is 
second-person death which evokes many intense emotions. The donor's family 
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thinks of whole brain-death without calm and rational minds. They use 
subjective perceptions to understand their beloved one's death and they are 
inclined to conclude that whole brain-death can not be death of a person. They 
want to fulfill their obligation to stay by and share the beloved one's death until 
the last moment. They tend to regard the recipient's approaching death as 
simply the death of a stranger which evokes no strong emotions. As a result, 
they employ aspects of third-person ethics, the principle of justice, for example, 
to defend the donor's rights. 
Therefore, the whole brain-death and organ-transplantation debate in 
Japan is a manifestation of an even more profound conflict between second-
person relationships and third-person relationships. It is ultimately a conflict 
between the needs and the welfare of one's loved ones and those of strangers. 
In Japan, it seems that second-person relationships usually win. For the Japanese 
people, second-person relationships are much more important than third-person 
relationships. The donor's welfare is much more important than the recipient's 
welfare for the donor's family and the recipient's welfare is much more 
important than the donor's welfare for the recipient's family members. The 
"wall" is tall and difficult to overcome. 
Overcoming the "Wall" 
Between Donors and Recipients 
There are at least two ways to see the other side when we face a "wall": 
we can break down the wall or climb over it. The two share the same end of 
seeing the other side. However they differ in their means. Breaking down a 
wall implies that one destroys the differences between between second-person 
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relationships and third-person-relationships. This means that one comes to view 
third-person relationships as intimate and close, suggesting that strangers 
practically become loved ones. The metaphor of climbing over a "wall" implies 
that it still exists but one tries to climb over it to see stranger's genuine needs. 
The second way, that of climbing over the "wall" is often thought to be more 
realistic. The key to overcoming the "wall" is, therefore, the existence of a 
special morality, a tool like a ladder that makes us able to scale it and to see the 
needs of strangers. 
The "Gift of Life" in North America 
What makes it possible for greater numbers of people in North America 
to scale the "wall" and to accept whole brain-death and organ-transplantation? 
This question has attracted many scholars in Japan. Umehara, one of the leading 
Japanese philosophers who objects to legalizing whole brain-death in Japan, 
contends that there are two philosophical factors that inform North American 
attitudes.83 These are body-mind dualism and pragmatism. Body-mind dualism, 
rooted in Descartes' thought, makes consciousness the central feature of human 
life in a way that leads to rationalism. Umehara reasons that it is logical for 
mind-body dualism to arrive at the conclusion that whole brain-death is a 
person's death. In addition, Umehara refers to what the Japanese call "ningen-
kikai-ron" ("human-machine theory") which represents the human being as a 
physical machine. This word was originally found in La Mettrie's book, L' 
Homme Machine and then translated into Japanese so that there is no equivalent 
term in English.84 Umehara insists that this theory makes sense of the idea of 
exchanging bad parts of a body with good parts from other bodies, making 
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organ transplantation a reasonable and rational medical option. Further, 
Umehara insists that pragmatism is so deeply embedded in North American 
belief systems that it has become "common sense": what produces effective 
consequences is right and what doesn't is wrong. Under the influence of 
pragmatism, North Americans tend to think that the criteria of whole brain-
death ought to be employed over cardio-respiratory criteria because they are 
more convenient for organ transplantation. 
There is no doubt that the body-mind dualism, "ningen-kikai-ron," and 
pragmatism that Umehara identifies actually do provide philosophical pressures 
that encourage North Americans to accept whole brain-death and organ- 
transplantation. However, Nudeshima correctly observes that there must still be 
other motivating factors. Nudeshima insists that concept of the "Gift of Life" is 
one of these additional factors.85 So what is the "Gift of Life?" How does this 
concept encourage North Americans to believe that organs can be gifts? The 
answer to these questions seems to be related to the Christian idea of neighbor-
love, which is also prevalent in North America. 
Christian Neighbor-Love  
The Bible includes several discussions of Christian neighbor-love. 
However, one of these is particularly effective. This is the parable of "the Sheep 
and the Goats" taken from the Gospel according to Matthew." 
The parable begins with a scene in which all people are gathered in front 
of "the Son of man" who separates "his sheep" on his right side from "the goats" 
on his left. The Son of man says to the people on his right, "Come, ye blessed of 
my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the 
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world." The reasons why they can inherit the kingdom follow: "For I was an 
hungred, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a 
stranger, and ye took me in: Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited 
me: I was in prison, ye came unto me." Then the righteous surprisingly ask 
Him: "Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, and fed thee? Or thirsty, and gave 
thee drink? When saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in? Or naked, and 
clothed thee? Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee?" The 
righteous people appear deeply surprised by the Lord's invitation to inherit the 
kingdom because they do not remember that they offered Him food, drink, 
clothes, and a place to stay although, as the Lord says, they certainly offered 
these to strangers. 
In order to understand this parable from the perspective of the Japanese 
ethics of relationships, we need to know who is in the parable and how they are 
related with each other. There are four general figures in the parable: the Lord, 
the righteous, the unrighteous, and the "least." Without any difficulty, it can be 
understood that the relationship between the Lord and the righteous is a very 
close second-person one. To the contrary, the relationship between the 
righteous and "the least of these" is not as close and intimate as the one with the 
Lord. Therefore, the relationships between the righteous and "the least" are 
third-person relationships. 
In response to the inquiry of the righteous, the Lord states the essential 
lesson of this parable: "Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto 
one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." The central 
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point of the parable, therefore, is very clear: simple help offered to "the least" is 
equal to help offered to the Lord. 
Although this parable is generally viewed as defining God's standard of 
judgment, as Barclay points out,87 it is also interpreted as helping us realize that 
assisting strangers is analogous to helping the Lord. This motivates persons not 
only to refrain from being unethical toward strangers, but also to offer 
generous, positive help to them. The essence of Christian neighbor-love, 
therefore, is a special ethical analogy that makes it possible to feel as though 
strangers are significant people. This analogy uses the Lord as a metaphor to 
transform less intimate and more distant third-person relationships into more 
close and more personal second-person ones. 
This parable also suggests that there are no third-person relationship for 
God because every person is significant to Him. In addition, the parable depicts 
the finite and fallible nature of human beings as a moral agents. We are inclined 
to view others only as strangers, or as "the least" whose existence is grasped 
only in third-person relationships. We human beings may act morally in second-
person relationships but immorally in third person ones. We tend to be more 
altruistic, compassionate, and kind with significant others but more selfish and 
cruel with strangers. The ethics of relationships effectively reminds us of the 
essential difference between our morality and God's. In God's morality there is 
no difference between first-person ethics, second-person ethics, and third-person 
ethics. In fact, God's morality expresses only one type of ethics, God's 
unconditional love for all. 
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Moral imagination 
Compared to the heavy emphasis of Western bioethics on principles, 
moral imagination has received far less attention in North America than it 
deserves. Johnson proposes that "our moral understanding is essentially 
imaginative."88 Using his experience of the Vietnam War, Johnson emphasizes 
that ethical theories and principles can only help us increase our moral 
understanding, but "never tell us what we should do in our real lives." Ethical 
theories can help us to understand who we are and what ethical options we 
have, but they can never tell us which options we should choose. Moral 
imagination, by contrast, makes us able to place ourselves imaginatively in 
various circumstances. By imaginatively putting ourselves in certain 
hypothetical situations, we can acquire a realistic sense of what the consequences 
of our actions will be. This can evoke our moral sensitivities and eventually 
motivate us to choose one option. In particular, moral imagination allows us to 
see things from the perspectives of other people, thus helping us to make less 
selfish and more impartial decisions. 
Christian neighbor-love is one type of moral imagination. The key to 
understanding this again lies in the interpretation of relationships. Moral 
imagination of the first-person is the capacity to picture a sell-image that will 
result from one's own autonomous decision. Ordinarily, when one faces a 
situation where moral a decision is required, one analyzes the situation, applies 
ethical principles and theories, compares and contrasts possible options, then 
draws a moral conclusion. 
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Moral imagination should be integrated into the process of examining 
options. Moral imagination of the first-person helps one to imagine the most 
likely results of one's own autonomous choices upon one's subsequent self-
image, thereby helping one to draw a moral conclusion. Moral imagination of 
the third-person is the capacity to picture the group-image that will result from 
the group's decisions. Based upon relationships between oneself and strangers, 
it helps one to put oneself in the place of larger group, such as the enterprise, 
community, or state, and motivates one to imagine how one's actions, or the 
group's action, will affect it as a whole. Moral imagination of third-person, thus, 
can be characterized by attenuation of the self in favor of the group's gain. 
Moral imagination of the second-person indicates the capacity to picture 
anticipated relationship between oneself and significant others. Johnson 
appropriately calls this moral imagination "empathetic imagination" and depicts 
it as follows: 
It is the capacity for one to imagine oneself in another's situations. 
To be empathetic means to imagine oneself in the place of another, 
to become more sensitive to others' needs, and to see the world 
through the eyes of others but not through one's own values and 
ideals.89  
The most important characteristic of moral imagination in second-person 
relationships is the desire to know the other's values and ideals. When we 
engage in moral-imagination of the first-person, we have to know only our own 
values and ideals to imagine and judge whether an action is morally sound. 
Once we engage in second-person relationships, however, the probable impact 
of one's choice on others must be imagined and judged not only from one's own 
perspectives but also from the perspectives of others. Although it is impossible 
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for one to know for certain how a significant other is going to perceive one's 
action, it is better for one to know his or her values and ideals. These may 
provide important indications as to how one's choices may affect him or her. 
Moral imagination is an effective tool to motivate people to become more 
sensitive to the needs of others, to evoke moral emotions and feelings, and thus 
to help others. 
Some relatives of organ donors do engage in this moral imagination of 
the second-person. When they decide to donate their loved one's organs to 
strangers, they imagine that their own child is waiting for an organ. In addition, 
some families report that they have to imagine a potential recipient in order to 
decide to donate organs.9° This appears to indicate that a vivid imagination of 
the recipient's needs, pains, and hopes can help a family regard a potential 
recipient not as a stranger but as a significant person. 
All this makes it clear why North Americans can somewhat more easily 
than the Japanese overcome the "wall" between strangers and accept the 
concept of "gift of life" somewhat more easily than the Japanese. The rich 
tradition of Christianity in the West, especially Christian neighbor-love, 
encourages North Americans to develop a special moral imagination that makes 
it possible for them to perceive and treat strangers as though they are significant 
others. This concept of Christian neighbor-love is deeply embedded in the belief 
systems of North Americans. Therefore, they often find it easier to accept the 
concept of the "gift of life" as morally praiseworthy. This concept of neighbor-
love is not as prevalent in Japan. 
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The Japanese Concept of "Gift"  
Pointing out that the Western religions and intellectual traditions provide 
a fundamental basis for developing the concepts of whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation, Ohnuki-Tierney, a cultural anthropologist, suggests that organ 
donation expresses Judeo-Christian values such as love and altruism. Yet, 
Ohnuki-Tierney claims that "donated organs - 'the gift of self,' literally - are not 
and cannot be the gift of self because organ donation lacks the most critical 
element of gift giving and exchange: social relationship."91  
Ohnuki-Tierney examines the Japanese practice of gift exchange so as to 
demonstrate how it sustains social relationships. According to her observations, 
Japanese people exchange gifts "in such a way that one remains indebted to the 
other, causing the social relationship to continue."92 One way to do so is never to 
repay a gift at its full value, thereby giving the recipient an opportunity to return 
another gift on a subsequent occasion. Quoting Mauss' work, she emphasizes 
that in Japan exchanging gifts is used to establish and to maintain social 
relationships by both making and repaying debts. Then she points out that for 
the Japanese organ donation cannot reflect the meaning of gift exchange because 
it is unilateral. 
It is now apparent why the Japanese are hesitant to donate organs. There 
are at least two essential reasons. First, an emotional and psychological "wall" 
prevents them from understanding and sharing the needs, emotional upheavals, 
and welfare of those on the opposite side of the transaction. More importantly, 
the second reason is that they lack a special moral tool that would motivate them 
to climb over the "wall" to see and understand things on the other side, a 
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concept like Christian neighbor-love. The Japanese do not have the custom of 
giving gifts to strangers. This makes them, in general, less interested in the 
welfare of strangers and in donating organs to them. 
Anonymity  
After the Organ Transplantation Law was enforced in October of 1997, 
there was no organ-transplantation from a whole brian-dead patient until 
February of 1999. Since then there have been eight cadaveric donors in Japan 
while there were 5798 cadaveric donors in North America during 1998 alone, 
according to the United Network for Organ Sharing.93  
These numbers make it difficult not to conclude that the Japanese people 
are still more hesitant to donate organs than North Americans, which makes one 
wonder how organ-transplantation can be established in Japan. Organ donation 
is essential for organ transplantation. The simple fact is that there can be no 
organ transplantation if there is no organ donation. Therefore, the success of 
organ transplantation in Japan depends on how well the Japanese can be 
motivated to donate organs. 
One way to encourage this would be to use the traditional metaphor of 
"gift of life," or the recently adopted metaphor of "relay of life," in Japan. This 
may heighten awareness among the Japanese people about the need for organs 
and secure their agreement to donate. The emphasis should be placed on 
helping families fulfill their sense of obligation to carry out the deceased person's 
sincere desire to donate his or her organs. This should be regarded as a 
traditional approach because it has been used in North America for a long time. 
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Another way to encourage organ donation in Japan is more radical. This 
would be to abolish the usual practice of maintaining anonymity between the 
donor and the recipient sides. The logic of abolishing anonymity is simple: if the 
"wall" between the donor's and the recipient's sides prevents the Japanese from 
donating organs, and if there is no special ethics that can help them to climb and 
overcome the "wall" to see the needs of those on the other side, then the only 
remaining option is to destroy it, or at least lower it enough to allow those on 
each side to see each other. 
How can this be done? The easiest, and most effective way would be to 
wholly or partially to transform the more distant third-person relationships into 
more intimate and close second-person ones by wholly or partially removing the 
barrier that prevents people on both sides from appreciating each other's 
challenges. This more intimate knowledge would not depend upon moral 
imagination but upon actual contact with actual people facing actual difficulties. 
It would enable those on each side of the "wall" to know real people on the 
opposite side in a genuine and not merely in an imaginative way. 
Several considerations favor the radical approach. In order to share the 
pain and agonies of others, we must know them intimately. But for the 
Japanese, organ-donation can not be an ordinary act of love because they do not 
know how to perceive and treat strangers as if they are close significant others. 
This does not mean that Japanese people are barbarous and narrow-minded. It 
simply means that they do not have the custom of thinking and acting in these 
ways. In Japan, in order for organs to become gifts, there must be reciprocity. 
Under the veil of anonymity, this is impossible. Thus, the Japanese must invent 
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some way to enable those on the donor side and those on the recipient side to 
know each other. The whole or partial abolishment of anonymity is a promising 
way to accomplish 
The traditional and common belief that knowing each other is harmful for 
those on both the donor and the recipient sides must be re-examined. Since the 
beginning of organ-transplantation, the principle of anonymity has reigned as an 
untouchable rule that is rarely reconsidered. However, how can we know the 
real harm of relaxing this rule without trying it? In fact, it may be that some 
donors and recipients do want to know more about each other. This may 
suggest that not knowing each other may actually be harmful for those on both 
the donor and the recipient sides. 
Summary 
This chapter began with one Japanese woman's decision not to receive 
life-saving organ-transplantation in order to identify what is a missing element in 
the Japanese controversy. In order for Miss Terao to live, she needed fresh 
organs, but that meant she must wait for others to die. For Miss Terao, this was 
a very serious and cruel moral conflict. This depicts what is the essential problem 
in the whole brain-death and organ transplantation controversy in Japan. What 
is missing in the controversy is a mutual understanding of these issues on the 
part of those on both the donor and the recipient sides. However the debate did 
not settle the confict that Miss Terao faced. It only divided people into two 
camps, those on the donor side and those on the recipient side, and few now see 
the problems from both points of view. The essential cause of these problems is 
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the "wall" between the two sides which implies insensitivity and indifference to 
the needs of those on the other side. Because the Japanese people do not have a 
special ethics like Christian neighbor-love, one form of moral imagination which 
helps North Americans see strangers as if they are loved ones, and because the 
Japanese do not have the custom of giving gifts without reciprocity, it is 
unrealistic to expect them to donate organs to strangers. 
The most promising solution would be to abolish the ordinary practice of 
maintaining anonymity between those on the donor and the recipient sides so 
that each is finally able to become more realistic about the needs of those on the 
other side. All Japanese people should first attempt to put themselves on both 
sides of this exchange. Each should try to understand the pains, agonies, hopes, 
and needs of each. Only by doing this, can the Japanese people truly understand 
that, as Fujii points out, they can live by helping others to live and by letting 
others help them to live.94 
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Chapter IV 
Implications for North American Bioethics: 
Reflections 
The first chapter of this study suggests that whole brain-death criteria 
have been regarded as the central, yet-to-be-resolved issue in the Japanese organ 
transplantation controversy. The most common hypothesis is that the Japanese 
hesitation to accept whole brain-death as a person's death prevents organ 
transplantation from becoming rooted in Japanese society. This study's second 
chapter surveys the various reasons that are often offered in support of this 
hypothesis. The third chapter of this study argues that we should try to see what 
is going on beneath the surface of the reservations of the Japanese people 
regarding whole brain-death. It concludes that a distinctive Japanese ethical 
orientation, which puts much emphasis upon second-person relationships, 
makes it hard for the people of Japan to believe that their significant others who 
fulfill the requirements of whole brain-death criteria are actually dead. 
This ethical orientation makes it difficult for those on both the donor side 
and the recipient side to see the other's special needs. This phenomena was 
illustrated as an emotional and psychological "wall" that stands between those 
on the donor side and those on the recipient side preventing each from seeing 
the other's pain and needs. Without the presence of the distinctive moral 
imagination of Christian neighbor-love, it may be that the Japanese will have to 
look for an alternative way to overcome this "wall." One promising suggestion 
is to remove the requirement of anonymity that separates the donor side and 
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the recipient side so that those on both sides can become non-strangers who 
share each other's pain and understand each other's needs. Hopefully this will 
lead to a reciprocal "gift of life." 
Ethics of Organ Donation and 
Transplantation in North America 
The most practical implication of the Japanese controversy for North 
American bioethics is that the ethics of organ donation and transplantation in 
North America deserves to be critically reviewed. Organ donation appears to be 
successful in North America because the metaphor of the "gift of life" appears to 
be well accepted. In general, it seems that this is an effective expression by 
which to motivate people to become organ donors in North America. However 
some are starting to disagree with this conclusion. 
Siminoff and Chillag recently pointed out that the "gift of life" should no 
longer be considered an effective metaphor in North America. Although it is 
supposed to convince people that organ donation is virtuous, altruistic, and 
good, an insufficient number of organ donations is increasingly a problem in 
North American society. Siminoff and Chillag observe that "families' 
unwillingness to do so when asked in actual donation situations" is the the 
essential cause of insufficient organ donations. They claim that the common 
assumption that "awareness of need would be enough to persuade people to 
donate" is simply too optimistic, even in North America.95 
Siminoff and Chillag suggest that the "gift of life" metaphor is 
"fallacious." They are convinced by gift exchange theory that, without social 
relationships and social reciprocity, it is contradictory. There can be no 
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reciprocity between the donor and the recipient because the donor cannot be a 
"gift giver." The donor is a "gift object" rather than a "gift giver" because he or 
she is already dead when organs are procured and donated. Likewise, the 
recipient cannot be a "gift receiver" who is supposed to repay the debt. "The 
debt cannot be repaid to the deceased 	 nor can a gift of such magnitude -- of 
life itself -- be adequately repaid to a proxy" they claim. 
Siminoff and Chillag use their recent research regarding the donation and 
transplantation experience to report several other interesting findings. Their 
studies show that in North America eighty percent of healthcare providers 
disagree with donating organs of their relatives, whereas only three percent 
believe in cardiovascular death as a person's true death. This suggests that 
whether or not one believes in whole brain-death criteria does not necessarily 
correlate with one's willingness to donate organs. Their research also shows that 
in North America there are still many misconceptions and confusions caused by 
the concept of whole brain-death among surviving family members. 
Their research identifies a number of trends that are also seen in Japan. 
Some family members in North America exhibit certain beliefs about the body 
and burial that discourage organ donation, such as that "one should leave the 
world as one entered it." By donating a beloved one's organs, some family 
members find "hope that the patient will somehow live on in others" and show a 
"desire to help others, especially so that the death of the patient would accrue 
meaning." These findings about recent trends in North America concur with this 
study's report that in Japan organ donation is often made by family members 
for the sake of the donor rather than the recipient. In North America, as in 
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Japan, many family members tend not to donate organs because they 
altruistically want to help strangers. Rather they do so mainly because they 
want to honor and fulfill a loved one's choice or because they want to find some 
meaning in their loved one's death. 
Given these various suggestions, Siminoff and Chillag contend that 
"altruism is not necessarily the primary motivation when families decide to 
donate." They state that the "gift of life" metaphor is a fallacious concept that no 
longer serves its original function of motivating people to give a gift for the sake 
of recipient. They insist that there is a strong need for an alternative metaphor. 
The ethics of organ donation in North America appears to consist of two 
discrete beliefs. First, someone's autonomous choice to donate organs to save 
others should be respected. Second, donating organs is a virtuous and 
honorable deed that coheres with Christian neighbor-love. However, it is 
becoming apparent that these two convictions do not promote organ donation 
and transplantation to the needed extent. This makes some wonder why the 
"gift of life" metaphor has not been more successful even in North America. 
A straightforward answer might be that all human-beings are naturally 
self-centered. Japanese philosopher lida uses European social contract theory to 
demonstrate that human nature is basically selfish.96 Proposed by Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau, social contract theory successfully guaranteed individual 
freedom and equality, but it also highlighted the self-centered nature of human-
beings which surfaced in the form of pursuing individual rights. Iida points out 
that for naturally selfish human beings the "gift of life" metaphor, which stands 
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on the principle of self-sacrifice, is a "god-like or superhuman ethics" that cannot 
be rooted in ordinary human society. 
North America also appears to be facing a new problem. The "gift of life" 
metaphor does not help the donor's family members or the recipients after 
organ transplantation. A documentary televised by Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation) in 2000 revealed that North America has now turned 
its attention to what awaits the donor's family and the recipient after organ 
donation.97 The program highlighted the tremendous senses of guilt and 
repentance experienced by the donor's surviving relatives toward their decision 
to agree with organ donation. The program also depicted the complex reality of 
the recipient's life after transplantation: the inward struggle and loss of identity. 
These findings suggest that the "gift of life" metaphor might be effective enough 
to motivate some family members to donate their loved one's organs, but not 
effective enough to assure them that the donation decision was the right thing to 
do at the time. Also, the metaphor appears not to guarantee that recipients will 
experience inner peace and comfort after receiving organs as a gift. 
The documentary also revealed an interesting phenomena in North 
America: increasingly family members of donor's and recipients want to know 
more about each other. The documentary followed a donor's mother who 
desired to see the recipient so that she could hug her "son" once more. 
Accompanied by a transplantation coordinator, the mother was invited to the 
recipient's birthday party where they finally met each other for first time. They 
embraced each other, exchanged words, and spent time looking at the donor's 
pictures and discussing his life. 
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Afterwards, the donor's mother made a very interesting comment. She 
said that she felt her son's heart beating when she embraced the recipient, but 
that she finally understood it no longer belonged to her son but to the recipient. 
She said she finally realized that "the miracle" would never happen. It is 
inappropriate to generalize too much from this particular experience because of 
the lack of detailed information and parallel cases. Nevertheless, it does suggest 
that in North America there are unfilled desires on both the donor and recipient 
sides that cannot be wholly satisfied by the "gift of life" metaphor. 
It therefore appears that bioethics in North America is starting to realize 
that organ donation is a complex exchange that cannot be sustained only by the 
"gift of life" metaphor. It has complex psychological consequences for those on 
both the donor and the recipient sides. The most important implication is that the 
"gift of life" metaphor is not sufficient even in North America. North American 
bioethics should pursue an alternative path which will not merely help people to 
donate organs but also help them prevent or minimize negative psychological 
consequences for all after the transplantation. 
It would appear that Japan and North America have taken different paths 
in dealing with organ transplantation. Japan, viewing organ transplantation as 
unnatural from the beginning, must somehow become accustomed to the 
awkwardness of this new technology. North America, having comparatively 
less resistance to adopting it, seemingly must discover the unnaturalness and 
awkwardness of this already accepted therapy. Japan and North America 
concurrently started their learning processes in the last decade of 20th century. 
This suggests that there is still plenty of room for exploring how organ 
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transplantation ought to be ethically carried out in both Japan and North 
America, especially in terms of its psychological consequences for all who are 
involved. 
The Ethics of Relationships and 
North American Culture 
One of the most distinctive features of this study is its proposal that the 
ethics of relationships is a decisive factor in the Japanese doubts about whole 
brain-death and organ transplantation. However, because it is not yet a fully 
developed and justified theory, some may find it difficult to comprehend. It 
therefore seems appropriate to summarize it, add some theoretical explanations, 
and suggest some general contributions it can make to North American 
bioethics. 
The basic theme of the ethics of relationships is that a person ought to be 
represented as functioning in three types of relationships. Each type of 
relationships highlights a different aspect of human personhood and evokes 
different ethical principles and theories. First-person relationships evoke an 
hypothetical association between one's own mind and one's own self-image. 
Because the only moral subject involved in this relationship is oneself, this 
becomes the single source of moral standards. What is morally right or wrong 
tends to be determined by what one thinks is right or wrong. The moral 
question becomes "what should I, as a sole moral agent, do in this particular 
situation?" The principle of respecting one's autonomy, the theory of 
deontoldgy, and theory of virtue and character are categorized as ethics of first-
person relationships. These principles and theories all tend to emphasize that the 
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singular individual is the central moral agent who possesses the moral authority 
or is the source of the moral standards that determine what is right and wrong. 
Second-person relationships represents very close affinities between the 
self and significant others. In these kinds of relationships, there at least are two 
moral subjects, the self and the significant others who now share moral authority 
and together become the source of the moral standards that determine what is 
morally right or wrong. The moral question now becomes "what should we, I 
and my loved one, do in this particular situation?" As stated before, the principle 
of beneficence, the ethics of care, the ethics of feminism, and the traditional 
Japanese ethics of " jinrin" can be categorized as ethics of second-person 
relationships. They all emphasize that what makes an action morally right or 
wrong depends upon how well it results in the best outcomes for significant 
others as well as for oneself. 
Third-person relationships represent comparatively distant connections 
between the self and strangers who share moral authority and are the source of 
the moral standards that determine what the self and the whole ought to do. 
The moral question then becomes "what should we, I and those strangers 
together, do in this particular situation in order to keep peace, equilibrium, and 
order within this group, community, or nation?" The theory of utilitarianism and 
the principles of justice and equality can be regarded as ethics of third-person 
relationships because in them what is morally right or wrong is determined by 
what will enhance the interests or protect the rights of those who do not know 
each other well. 
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These three alternatives may be depicted in a diagram that demonstrates 
that the ethics of relationships can achieve different forms of moral equilibrium 
depending upon how much weight is placed on each of the three types of 
relationships. The diagram displays the three kinds of relationships on a 
horizontal line. First-person relationships are on the left, second-person 
relationships are on the center, and third-person relationships are on the right, all 
positioned according to the number of moral subjects involved in each of the 
three relationships. 
First-Person Relationships 	 Second-Person Relationship 	 Third-Person Relationships 
Each of these relationships is extremely important; each is equally required to 
depict a person. This sense of the equal necessity of each of the three types of 
relationships is a key concept in the ethics of relationships. 
How can we balance these three relationships? Second-person 
relationships play a decisive role in this process because they are located between 
first- and third-person relationships. This makes second-person relationships 
especially helpful in achieving balance, equilibrium, and order. This does not 
mean that they are more important than the other two kinds relationships. 
Rather, because they are psychologically positioned between first- and third-
person relationships, they are close enough to both to provide a better basis for 
equally balancing all three. 
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For example, if one takes a moral position closer to first-person 
relationships, the diagram below reveals its greater psychological distance from 
third-person relationships. Such a stance confines one's moral viewpoint within 
individualistic perspectives, making it more difficult to realize the significance of 
the other two kinds of relationships. In similar way, if one takes a moral position 
leaning toward third-person relationships, one limits one's moral viewpoint 
within group-centered perspectives and tends to neglect the other two kinds of 
relationships. However, if one takes a moral position centering upon second-
person relationships, the diagram shows that one is now equally close to both 
first- and third-person relationships. 
Second-person relationships have a better capacity to provide a moral 
position that allows us to avoid viewpoints that are confined and unbalanced in 
opposite ways. Because second-person relationships are located between first 
and third person relationships, they can effectively make us realize that one's 
moral approach should not be restricted to one particular type of relationships, 
but should be extended to cover all of the three in an equally balanced 
equilibrium. 
First-Person-Centered Model 
First-Person Relationship Second-Person Relationship 	Third-Person Relationship 
0 
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Third-Person-Centered Model 
First-Person Relationship Second-Person Relationship 	Third-Person Relationship 
< 	 
    
0 
    
< 	 
Second-Person-Centered Model 
Moral standards, in the simplest sense, show what is right and wrong. 
The ethics of relationships proposed in this study holds that the reality of the 
person ought to be drawn equally from all of the three types of relationships, 
just as God's reality is equally expressed in Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit. The 
ethics of relationships sets moral standards as follows: any action that makes us 
capture the reality of a person in an unbalanced and restricted way, that is to say, 
with an unbalanced concentration on one particular type of relationships, is 
91 
unethical even if the action itself is justified by the ethical resources usually 
associated with that one alternative. 
A good example with which to illustrate this moral standard is the 
justification of active, voluntary euthanasia based solely on the principle of 
autonomy. If one takes a moral position that concentrates only on first-person 
relationships, one tends to use principles such as autonomy to justify this kind of 
euthanasia. The ethics of relationships suggests that such justification is 
unethical, despite the fact that when taken by itself, the principle of autonomy 
may well ethically justify a decision to have one's life terminated. It is ethically 
wrong because it dismisses the other two important relational perspectives. If 
one wants to justify active, voluntary euthanasia, the ethics of relationships 
insists that one must do so from all three of the relational perspectives. This 
choice must be ethically justified and defended not only by the ethics of first-
person relationships but also by the ethics of second- and third-person 
relationships. Some general rules of the ethics of relationships can be 
summarized as follows: 
(1) The ethics of relationships proposes that moral blindness, 
that is to say, an unbalanced understanding of a person 
based upon only one instead of all three types of 
relationships, is morally wrong. Moral justification drawn 
from either (a) only one type of relationships or (b) from 
only one type of ethical theories cannot be valid. 
2) The perspective of second-person relationships possesses 
a capacity to help us avoid moral blindness because of its 
positional advantage over first- and third-person 
relationships. 
3) A moral justification is adequate if and only if it is equally 
supported by first-, second- and third-person relationships 
and their ethical resources. 
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The ethics of relationships can provide a helpful interpretation of moral 
diversity. From this perspective, moral diversity depends upon which type of 
relationships a person, group or culture emphasizes. Every person, group, or 
culture potentially shares and incorporates the very same basic moral theories 
and principles, but they may differ as to which type of relationships they 
emphasize. This diversity may lead them to employ different sets of moral 
principles and theories that correspond to the relationships they particularly 
emphasize. Geographical conditions , history, political and social systems, 
religion, and gender are some of the considerations that may influence a person, 
group, or culture to emphasize different relationships to different degrees. For 
example, as Carol Gilligan and some other scholars emphasize,98 women 
generally tend to emphasize second-person relationships. This influences them 
to employ the ethics of second-person relationships with priority upon 
beneficence, the ethics of care and so on. Another example would be communist 
nations which put a strong emphasis on third-person relationships. As a result, 
these nations tend to apply principles such as justice, equality, and utility to the 
society as a whole. This approach, which does not lend support to normative 
ethical relativism, provides important opportunities for further cross-cultural 
research and reflections. 
Whole Brain-Death in North America 
Although this is no longer as true as it once was, north American bioethics 
has a long tradition of putting much emphasis on the consciousness of the 
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individual. This, together with the American tradition of pragmatism, convinces 
people in that part of the world that death must be rationally and objectively 
understood rather than emotionally perceived. However, this consciousness-
centered approach appears to have one weak point. This is its inability to explain 
why people, even in North America, often feel hesitant to recognize both whole 
brain-dead patients and permanently vegetative patients as dead even though 
they fully understand that the both have forever lost consciousness. 
The consciousness-centered approach is very good at showing what 
differentiates higher brain-death from whole brain-death. What confuses people 
is not the objective and scientific difference between higher and whole brain-
death, but the appearance of patients in both states. Our rational minds tell us 
that whole and higher brain-death are rationally and objectively equivalent to 
the death of a person, but our emotional and subjective states often tell us the 
opposite. An even more problematic point is that the consciousness-centered 
approach convinces us that subjective perception in such matters is irrational, 
illogical, naive, and thus irrelevant. 
The ethics of relationships disagrees with such views and insists that our 
subjective perceptions of death ought to be respected. The Japanese ethics of 
second-person relationships understands the importance of how family 
members perceive their beloved one's circumstances and condition. A good 
example is the current transplantation law in Japan which allows the family 
members to choose the criteria of death they find most helpful. If the family 
members cannot accept whole brain-death criteria, the Japanese law allows them 
to choose traditional cardiovascular standards instead. 
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Lock summarizes what North American bioethics can learn from Japan: 
"What we learn from Japan is that the person (hito) is not equated with individual 
consciousness, nor is the person located in the brain. Personhood is diffused 
throughout the mind and body and, moreover, is a condition that is 
fundamentally social and not individual in essence."99 Adding to Lock's 
comment, we can emphasize that personhood is fundamentally relational as well 
as individual. Personhood is initiated and possessed by an individual, but at the 
same time it is developed, shared, and most importantly, completed by 
significant others. This sense of the unity, togetherness, and relatedness of 
second-person relationships is a central feature of Japanese morality that North 
American bioethics tends to dismiss too easily. This does not mean that North 
Americans lacks an intimate sense of unity within close relationships, but that, 
because of their strong emphasis upon individual consciousness, they dismiss 
their subjective emotions toward their loved ones as irrational and thus 
irrelevant. 
The point is very simple. According to the ethics of relationships, the so 
called "irrational" and "illogical" perceptions that we FEEL toward a brain-dead 
individual or permanently vegetative individual are as morally pertinent as our 
rational and scientific understandings. The death of someone we love is a very 
intimate and special event that cannot be defined merely by medical facts. 
Should we, must we, and most importantly, can we really believe, both at the 
rational and at the nonrational levels, in the whole brain or higher brain-deaths 
of our significant others? North American bioethics would do well seriously to 
seek an answer to this question. 
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Summary 
This chapter focused on what the whole brain-death and organ 
transplantation controversy in Japan can contribute to North American bioethics. 
It emphasized that the ethics of relationships can provide different perspectives 
that North American bioethics would do well to consider. The intention of these 
remarks is not to denounce the moral viewpoints of North American bioethics, 
but to show that there are moral perspectives that differ. In addition, this 
controversy ought to be viewed as illustrative of the general difference between 
Western thought and traditional Japanese ethics, and possibly Eastern ethics 
more generally. 
Of course, North American bioethics can totally dismiss the whole rest of 
the world as ethically irrelevant. But it is difficult to give up the idea that there is 
truth that cannot be discovered if we take a one-sided view. Whole brain-death 
and organ transplantation is such a case. North American bioethics ought to 
consider seriously the fact that about fifty percent of the Japanese people still feel 
uncomfortable about whole brain-death criteria. 
Japanese philosopher Hiroshi Mizutani uses an interesting analogy to 
emphasize the importance of both rationality and nonrationality in society. 
When we see a close friend off at train station, there are kinds of 
people who think that it is of no use to stay on the platform 
after we exchange farewells and we are no longer able to see the 
friend's face in the train. And there are also other kinds of 
people who like to stay at the platform and stand for a while 
even after the train has left. Aside from which type you like, the 
truth is that our society is made of these two kinds of people:100  
Mizutani points out that those who leave right away can be viewed as rational 
people and those who stay a while and feel affectionate toward the person who 
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left can be viewed as nonrational people. His point is not to ask which type is 
more ethical or which way is more ideal, but to understand that both rational 
and nonrational people are important because our society is formed of both of 
types. Given Mizutani's suggestion, it is important to acknowledge that we, 
North Americans and Japanese, have both rational and nonrational natures. Just 
as we value rationalism which propels science and medicine, we ought to 
appreciate our nonrational natures because they are among the things that make 
us human. 
Yanagida states that there are three areas in which Japan is said to be far 
behind North America and other advanced nations, according to the Japanese 
physicians who advocate whole brain-death and organ transplantation: (1) Japan 
is behind because its surgeons do not practice the high organ transplantation 
skills they possess; (2) Japan is behind because many Japanese people do not 
accept whole brain-death criteria; and (3) Japan is behind because the voluntary 
spirit of the "gift of life" has not yet been rooted firmly in Japanese society. 101  
Yet, we should not deny the possibility that what appears to be "behind" might 
sometimes actually be "ahead." 
It is difficult to draw a line between what we are morally allowed to do 
and what we are not. However, perhaps this line does not always have to be 
drawn from rational, logical, and pragmatic viewpoints. We may sometimes 
find it helpful to draw this line based upon our nonrational, illogical, and non-
pragmatic emotions and feelings. We might do well to have the courage to 
admit that sometimes we experience a "must-not-cross" line without attempting 
to provide logical and pragmatic justification. We human beings are nonrational 
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beings as well as logical ones. Thus, both Western rationalism and Japanese 
nonrationalism are vital components of the whole global community. We 
should try not to rely too much on one or the other. 
A sense of balance is vital in such approaches. In order to balance things, 
we need wisdom and careful observation. Wisdom is needed to help us compare 
and contrast different cultures and their unique traditions so as learn from all of 
them how best to deal with difficult ethical problems. Wisdom is needed to 
balance Western rationalism and Eastern nonrationalism. This is what the goal 
of globalized bioethics in the twenty-first century should be. 
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Bold arrow indicates: 
1) relationship of second person 
2) death of second person 
3) relationship is more intimate 
4) relationship is thus more visible 
5) Ethics of secondary relationships at work 
Ex: Beneficience, Ethics of Care 
Dotted arrow indicates: 
1) relationship of third person 
2) death of third person 
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4) relationship is thus more invinsible 
5) Ethics of third relationships at work 
Ex: Justice and respecting autonomy 
107 
